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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
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by 
Brian Bergstrom 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2012 
Professor Pascal Boyer, Chairperson 
 
  
The studies reported here explore some of the cognitive contours of epistemic vigilance—
that is, how the mind adaptively tracks and monitors information.  These studies ask how the 
mind considers the source of new information when making epistemic judgments.  Four 
experiments investigate the role of source information in modulating the “truth bias” (an 
automatic tendency to presume new information is true).  An evolutionary hypothesis is 
advanced: that a “support bias” exists for sources with special coalitional relevance (e.g., a best 
friend) that interacts with the truth bias to produce supportive patterns of recall that are unique to 
that source.  Results partially support this hypothesis.  Participants who read statements 
ostensibly from a real best friend (identified by participants) show patterns of recall that differ 
from recall for statements from other sources, and these patterns are consistent with a “support 
bias” interpretation.  These results may be influenced by valence; using sources who are positive 
and negative (but not coalitional) also elicit modified patterns of recall—but not at the level of 
automatic belief.  Finally, when the communicated content is precautionary information, 
evidence for the truth bias and the support bias disappears.  The need for additional study of 
source-processing, and its relationship to statement structure and content, is discussed.      
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Introduction 
Consider the following scenarios.  
While driving to work, your car radio is tuned to NPR and you are learning about a new 
political development in the African nation of Sudan when, suddenly, the driver in front of you 
stops unexpectedly for a yellow light.  You slam on your brakes and narrowly avoid impact.  
While waiting for your racing pulse to abate, the light turns green, NPR moves on, and Sudan is 
no longer on your mind.  
Later that morning, you skim the news updates in Science and Nature.  Your inbox 
announces the arrival of an important email, and your attention is diverted to an urgent matter for 
the next hour.   
During lunch, a colleague relays to you a piece of historical trivia.  Your cell phone rings 
with a call you have to take.  When lunch resumes, conversation shifts and the trivia recedes into 
the past.   
Now if at some future time you reencounter some of the information that was interrupted 
earlier (Sudan, Science, trivia), would you believe it?  More specifically, would the interruption 
have affected your judgment of its truth?  Would you remember where or from whom the 
information came?  And if you did, would the source of the information affect your judgment of 
truth?  
This last question represents the target inquiry of the present research, and the thinly-
veiled hypothetical scenarios mark its pertinence to everyday affairs.  Existing research on the 
cognitive dynamics of belief has suggested preliminary answers to how we ascertain truth under 
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conditions of compromised processing, but the question of how belief is affected by source 
information—from where or from whom our information derives—has not been fully addressed.   
The line of research most relevant to the present inquiry, and which informs the empirical 
approach of the present studies, is the work of Dan Gilbert and colleagues on belief formation, or 
what might be called “default belief” (Gilbert, 1991). The basic question of his research has been 
how the mind treats new information during the very earliest stages of processing: that is, how 
the mind registers the “truth status” of new information as it is being comprehended, before any 
explicit judgment can be rendered.  An interest in this early stage of belief formation is 
analogous to the real-world example of reading a news statement on the Internet and then having 
one’s attention eclipsed by an interrupting email.  Before we have time to evaluate the new 
information, does the mind automatically assume it to be true (or false), or does the mind instead 
hold the information in a neutral state of agnostic uncertainty (until we can later assess it more 
scrupulously)?   
Gilbert casts the origin of this question back several centuries to the philosophies of Rene 
Decartes and Barauch Spinoza, to their differing opinions on the question of whether it is 
possible to hold an idea or piece of information in a suspended state of nonbelief (i.e., a state 
where one ascribes neither truth nor falsity)—that is, whether we can “consider an idea” without 
“considering it so” (Gilbert et al., 1990).  Descartes held the opinion that new information could 
be treated impartially, could be comprehended but not necessarily endorsed or rejected until 
one’s reasoned judgment was brought to bear.  Spinoza, however, held the opinion that the very 
act of comprehending a statement included an initial assent, a tacit epistemic acceptance of the 
information as true which would persist unless deliberately revised (Gilbert, 1991).   
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Gilbert’s research program aimed to assay these conjectures on original belief 
empirically, to know via experimental control whether or not the mind automatically assumes 
that new information is true when first encountered.  Toward this end, the general protocol 
adopted (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1989; Gilbert et al., 1993) was a laboratory arrangement in which 
participants could (1) encounter new information (2) about which they had little or no 
background knowledge, and (3) occasionally be denied (via interruption) the time and attentional 
resources to think deeply about the content presented.  The rationale for the third condition was 
that interruption, introduced at the right moment, could allow participants to read (comprehend) 
a new piece of information but then prevent them from thinking deeply about it (evaluate).  By 
controlling a subject’s exposure to the information and their processing of it, one can later 
measure subjects’ impressions of these interrupted statements (i.e., whether they seem true or 
false) and gain insight into the cognitive presuppositions about which Descartes and Spinoza 
could only speculate.  That is, one could assess the “default belief” of information that had been 
comprehended but not evaluated.   
The results of these studies (discussed in greater detail below) give pride of place to 
Spinoza by supporting his suggestion that we “believe first,” and only later explicitly affirm or 
reject our initial presuppositions (Gilbert et al., 1989; Gilbert et al., 1993).  However, these 
studies have notably lacked any inclusion of source information (a communicator or other 
epistemic origin through which information is received), and this marks a substantial departure 
from how information is normally encountered.  The new information we daily encounter almost 
always has a discernible source, and the goal of the present dissertation studies is to use the 
experimental protocol established by Gilbert to begin exploring the source memory and source 
monitoring questions with which we began.  More specifically, the studies here explore the 
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possibility that the influence of source information on belief follows causal pathways of 
evolutionary relevance, reflecting selection pressures that acted on important epistemic 
differences among ancestral communicators. 
Why the Source Matters: Epistemics in Evolutionary Perspective 
Humans are by nature a social species, and (more importantly) a species where the vast 
majority of acquired knowledge is procured via innumerable communicative transactions 
between individuals, rather than wrought from direct individual experience (Tooby & Devore, 
1987).  Thus, for humans, information almost always comes from somewhere, typically 
someone. Even in contemporary environments dominated by electronic and print media such as 
journals, newspapers, television and the internet, the cultural transmission of information rarely 
omits information about authors or fails to provide traceable references, and media sources 
themselves can be construed as individual sources (e.g., MSNBC, FOX News, etc.), despite of 
course comprising the work of many distinct individuals.  
However, for a species so unequivocally reliant upon others for information, the prospect 
of malicious deception is—and has been—a serious threat to evolutionary fitness (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2000).  Communicative interactions involve individuals with distinct identities, histories, 
motives, intentions, affiliations, and epistemic profiles (age, trustworthiness, background 
knowledge, reliability, and so on).  On an evolutionary view, an individual who possessed 
complex language without also possessing some sensitivity to the epistemic differences among 
communicators would not have fared well by the measure of natural selection, because the 
potential dangers of misinformation are many and great, and the fitness consequences 
immediate: a rival who told you the green berries were safe to eat may be one rival less by 
morning. 
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As such, though many scholars have touted the enormous practical and adaptive utility of 
the language faculty (e.g., Deacon, 1997; Pinker, 1994), others have drawn attention to the 
cognitive difficulties and computational vulnerabilities that are inexorably linked to language 
(e.g., Bergstrom, Moehlmann, & Boyer, 2005; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Sperber, 2006).  
Without some form of epistemic vigilance—means of adaptively managing information to guard 
against error, false-believe, and deception—subjective knowledge stores would become quickly 
corrupted, and fitness quickly compromised.  A language-wielding organism needs cognitive 
mechanisms that help guard against deceptive communication from peers or enemies by taking 
the reliability and knowledge of a speaker into account, updating old inferences in light of new 
information or special circumstance, filtering out useless information, and applying information 
in appropriately selective, conditional, or probabilistic ways.  Psychological designs that failed to 
respond to these vulnerabilities would have exhibited poor biological fitness and been replaced 
by more efficient, reliable, consistent, and economical designs (Williams, 1966).   
 Sperber (2006) has suggested that the evolution of language occurred as an arms race 
between communicators and addressees, each with imperfect motives and knowledge, where the 
dynamics of truth versus untruth, and trust versus distrust, continually supplied selection pressure 
for cognitive mechanisms that enabled increasingly refined and savvy communication.  Though 
“arms race” terminology fosters a sense of antagonism, linguistic communication eventually 
stabilized among humans, because contemporary humans (descendents of the arms race) do of 
course engage in give-and-take communicative practices.  If the costs of language 
communication had outstripped its gains, the evolution of language would have stalled in its 
tracks.  This does not mean that the dangers of exploitation are any less consequential simply 
because language managed to evolve.  Instead, as Sperber (2006) notes, “if communication has 
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stabilized among humans, it must be that there are ways to calibrate one’s confidence in 
communicated information so that the expected benefits are greater than the expected costs” (p. 
182).  Calibration must be the expected essence of the cognitive design, because no general rule 
to “trust” or “distrust” information would be feasible as a uniform epistemic tactic (that is, game 
theoretical models show that language could not have evolved if ancestral humans had simply 
adopted an “always trust” or “always distrust” approach to communication).  The necessity of 
calibration—regulating trust according to communicator, circumstance, and experience—is a 
grounding principle of the present research.   
One of several possible ways to calibrate trust for a given communicator is to rely on a 
heuristic of “known benevolence” (Sperber, 2006).  For example, one can typically trust one’s 
relatives more than strangers, and one’s friends more than one’s enemies.  Such a heuristic is 
imperfect, of course, but alongside other tuning strategies can be useful.  This is the strategy 
explicitly considered in the present research: exploring whether the epistemic processing of 
information is different when it comes from coalitionally-relevant sources (“friends” and 
“enemies”) than when it comes from sources without coalitional relevance.  All else being equal, 
over the long course of language evolution, it would be unlikely in the extreme that natural 
selection would prove indifferent to “known benevolence” as a cognitive parameter operating 
within a cognitive ensemble of error-management operators.  The basic goal of this dissertation 
is to investigate the possibility that the cognitive operations governing the ascription of belief to 
new information also take into account the source of that information, even at the very earliest 
stages of information-processing previously researched by Gilbert and colleagues, and do so for 
reasons grounded in the evolutionary intersection of coalition and communication. 
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Coalition in Evolutionary Perspective 
To appreciate the theoretical importance of evolved psychological mechanisms for 
epistemic vigilance, it is critical that one consider the Machiavellian picture of ancestral sociality 
painted by anthropological and archeological research.  These studies reveal constant warfare 
between groups (e.g. combatant tribes), and also reveal constant cooperation, exchange, status 
and power struggles, alliance management, and coalitional fluctuations within groups.  In short, 
language evolved in a context of incessant social chess where group opportunities and threats 
abounded from within and without, and where considering the source of acquired information 
would have paid substantial inferential dividends.  Archaeological evidence points 
unambiguously to chronic warfare in ancestral environments (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003), and 
studies of primate species closely related to humans also illustrate the importance of coalitional 
alliances in social life (e.g., de Waal, 1982; Byrne & Whitten, 1988).  Trustworthiness, 
cooperativeness, and a good reputation were important factors for ancestral humans struggling 
with interdependent coordination (Kurzban & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008), and a 
cognitive system designed to calibrate trust and belief among different sources would have 
proved decisive in successfully negotiating the social arena.  As Kurzban & Neuberg (2005) 
note: “Any given [socio-linguistic] interaction … carries opportunity costs, as limits on the size 
of an individual’s social network mean that a particular social interaction precludes some others. 
. . . . [W]e should expect humans to exhibit discriminate sociality and to possess psychological 
mechanisms designed to preserve the benefits of sociality and simultaneously limit its costs” (p. 
653).   
Studies of social cognition reveal evidence of automatic and dynamic encoding of 
coalitional information (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001; see also Cosmides, Tooby, & 
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Kurzban, 2003), selective fear-conditioning to facial images of out-group members (Navarrete, 
Olsson, Ho, Mendes, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2009), domain-specific reasoning capacities geared 
for cheater-detection and social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), 
and selective trust, based on in-group/out-group affiliation (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009).  
These lines of evidence converge on a picture of ancestral sociality that was replete with social 
challenges (Buss, 2005; Daly & Wilson, 1988).  With virtually all social contact among humans 
mediated by the use of language (Barkow, 1992), where people engage in “linguistic grooming” 
rather than the “physical grooming” that is more phylogenetically common among primates 
(Dunbar, 1990), emergent psychological designs for epistemic vigilance may have been crucial 
to managing linguistic interactions, and avidly favored by natural selection. On the grounds of 
such evolutionary reasoning, then, we expect the human mind to exhibit design features tailored 
to successfully navigating the kinds of socio-linguistic-epistemic challenges that were routinely 
faced under ancestral living conditions.  Among these designs may be operations that 
automatically bias belief depending on the source, even prior to conscious or deliberate analysis, 
in a manner similar to Gilbert’s earlier findings.  We suspect that “coalition” (operationalized in 
the present studies as robust patterns of friendship and antagonism) may mark a decisive source 
distinction that carries early processing consequences.   
How might such designs evolve?  Heuristics and biases can evolve according to “error 
management” logic.  On this view, when the fitness costs of inferential errors in a particular 
domain are asymmetrical (i.e., Type I errors have more dire consequences than Type II errors, or 
vice versa), this can prompt natural selection to favor adaptively biased cognitive designs 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Haselton & Buss, 2000, 2003; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005).  
For example, over the course of human evolution, the overperception of snake-like stimuli as 
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snakes would have had adaptive utility, because the evolutionary cost of mistaking a stick in the 
grass for a snake were fleeting and trivial, but the reverse error of mistaking a snake for a stick 
would, on average, have had much greater adaptive cost. This asymmetry in the fitness costs of 
different cognitive errors can lead natural selection to engineer bias into the cognitive apparatus 
(in this case, perceptual bias within the visual system).  Importantly, even if that bias led to a 
greater number of total errors, if it led to lower adaptive cost, it could be favored.  If the ideal 
neurological designs for optimal evolutionary fitness and perfect cognitive accuracy diverge 
even slightly, the biological bottom-line of reproductive fitness will nudge our experience of 
reality accordingly.    
The research presented here explores the possibility that in the course of human 
evolution, natural selection may have favored the evolution of cognitive processes designed for 
epistemic vigilance, specifically designs that in their proper deployment serve “error 
management” coalitional functions in the realm of belief.  We suspect that distinctive patterns of 
recall error in judgments of truth will be found for different sources of information, and that 
these differences will be functionally rooted in coalitional differences relevant to participants. 
The outcome of these inquiries may prove relevant to any social affairs that tap 
coalitional dynamics: race relations, conflicts between religious affiliations, political factions, 
and much more.  They may help determine whether ostensibly epistemic judgments may 
sometimes be a matter of coalitional judgment.  If source differences are relevant to automatic 
belief, then some “errors” of recall may not be evidence of irrationality, nor evidence of limited 
processing capacity, but instead reflect evolved biases that served adaptive functions over 
evolutionary history.  Furthermore, to the extent that belief processing is influenced by 
coalitional factors, other experimental manipulations which alter coalitional dynamics, such as 
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the influence of synchrony on cooperation (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), or the influence of 
affiliation cues on racial encoding (Kurzban, et al., 2001) may also serve as manipulations 
affecting belief formation.   
Source Processing in Social and Cognitive Psychology 
Queries regarding the general nature of source processing (a term of broad construal) 
have been carried out through a number of research programs—e.g. source monitoring, 
developmental studies of trust, and attitude/persuasion research (all discussed below)—and 
provisional paths of understanding are being charted.  These related programs of research will be 
discussed to provide a larger empirical and historical context for the present research, and to 
distinguish the present experiments from this extant work.   
The Sleeper Effect 
 Several decades of attitude and persuasion research under the rubric of the “sleeper 
effect” have examined the relevance of source information to how we calibrate opinions and 
attitudes.  The sleeper effect has traditionally referred to a phenomenon whereby one’s attitude 
or opinion regarding a certain topic or argument (e.g., propaganda, politics, advertisements) 
changes over time (see Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; for a review see 
Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004).  More specifically, the effect denotes an attitude or opinion that 
becomes more congruent with an argument, even though one’s initial attitude or opinion was less 
congruent (or “discounted”) in virtue of its association with a dubious source (see Figures 1 and 
2) (e.g., Cook, Gruder, Hennigan, & Flay, 1979; Gillig & Greenwald, 1974; Hovland & Weiss, 
1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004; Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & 
Baumgardner, 1988; Sitton & Griffin, 1980; Underwood & Pezdek, 1998; Weiss, 1953).  For 
example, after reading about the benefits of a newly marketed product, your opinion of that 
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product might be skeptically low if the benefits of that product were promoted by the company 
that created it (i.e., your opinion would be discounted because of the source, and show low 
congruity with the advertised claim), but when queried weeks later, your opinion of that product 
would likely become more favorable (i.e., is no longer discounted, with a higher congruity 
between your opinion and the original advertisement).  Ostensibly, this occurs because your 
opinion is no longer offset or discounted by a consideration of the source of the advertisement, 
either because the source has been forgotten, or is simply not retrieved at the time of judgment.  
The “sleeper” is thus your opinion, which with silent stealth gravitates toward greater agreement 
over time.   
 
Figure 1. The sleeper effect (from Kumkale & Albarracın, 2004). 
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Figure 2. Original “sleeper effect” (from Hovland & Weiss, 1951). 
 Studies of the sleeper effect have typically placed a premium on ecological validity.  
Investigators have often eschewed artificial or fictional sources and stimuli in favor of 
information from real-world individuals, publications, and media.  Indeed, the earliest studies 
used pilot surveys to assess participants’ source knowledge days or weeks prior to study, and 
then carefully matched sources to plausible content (e.g., Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & 
Hovland, 1953).  These studies paired high-credible or low-credible sources with identical 
message content, and then documented the effect of these different sources (along with other 
variables) on subsequent attitudes or opinions. 
 While research on the sleeper effect reliably shows that people do consider the source of 
information (at least initially) and use that information to adjust their attitudes or opinions, there 
are a variety of important reasons to consider the sleeper effect an imprecise phenomenon and an 
inadequate gauge of how source information influences judgments of a statement’s veracity.   
 First, two different kinds of sleeper effect have been identified—“absolute” and 
“relative” sleeper effects (see Figures 3 and 4)—and these two types are associated with no less 
than five characteristic patterns of data (graphically illustrated in Figures 3 & 4), all of which are 
considered legitimate sleeper effects (for a review, see Kumkale & Albarracın, 2004).  Any 
Epistemic vigilance 
 13 
effect whose purview has grown to encompass so many distinct signatures in the data should 
elicit concern about the unity of the phenomenon under investigation, and by extension, scrutiny 
is justified regarding the processes implicated in their production.  
 
Figure 3. Examples of the “absolute” sleeper effect (from Kumkale & Albarracın, 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Examples of the “relative” sleeper effect (from Kumkale & Albarracın, 2004). 
 Second, efforts to delineate the conditions under which a sleeper effect can be reliably 
produced have shown that sufficient conditions are both very specific and highly contrived (e.g., 
Pratkanis et al., 1988).  Evaluation of these conditions suggests that producing a sleeper effect 
requires: (a) a very interesting and persuasive message, (b) a highly non-credible source, (c) the 
presentation of source information after (as opposed to concurrently or prior to) the presentation 
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of the message, and (d) a considerable delay between measures (normally 1-8 weeks, though 
some experimental protocols have shortened this delay by increasing the number of items 
presented, thereby simulating memory degradation over time; see Gruder, Cook, Hennigan, Flay, 
Alessis, & Halamaj, 1978; Pratkanis et al., 1988).  Examination of these enabling factors has 
shown that motivation, source credibility, timing of source presentation, and opportunity for 
elaborative encoding (of either content or source) critically modulate sleeper effects under 
laboratory conditions.  Adjustments to any one of these variables can disrupt the sleeper effect.  
This makes the implications of the sleeper effect for our understanding of source processing 
difficult to interpret, and reduces the confidence with which we can generalize to real-word 
settings and other research paradigms.   
 Third, although three primary theoretical explanations have been advanced to account for 
the sleeper effect, relatively little empirical headway has been made in evaluating these accounts 
(Kumkale & Albarracın, 2004).  Importantly, all three theoretical accounts pivot on source 
memory.  The proposed theories venture that: (1) memory for the source of information simply 
fades over time, so that during a delayed post-test, the (now unavailable) source can no longer 
calibrate (i.e., discount) one’s opinion as it did earlier; (2) memory for the source is retained but 
becomes dissociated from the message, so that when opinion is later re-assessed, the source is 
not spontaneously recalled and therefore cannot influence opinion; and (3) memory for the 
communicated content and the source fade over time, but at different rates (source decays faster), 
so that a differential decay between source and content drives the effect. To the extent that the 
sleeper effect hangs contingent on deficits of source memory, the question of what factors 
govern the encoding, storage, and retrieval of source information becomes increasingly 
important.  But to date this has not been a primary focus of interest.  Furthermore, although these 
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three accounts are related to other programs of research concerned with suggestibility and source 
memory (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), these other studies do not examine 
specifically the change of attitude or opinion after a significant delay that demarcates sleeper 
effect research from other memory studies (efforts to reduce the gap exist, however; see Sitton & 
Griffin, 1980; Underwood & Pezdek, 1998).  
 To summarize, these three critiques of the sleeper effect—its fragile and highly 
contingent production, its plurality of data signatures, and its under-specified cognitive origins—
render it imperfectly suited to illuminating the questions of source-processing with which this 
dissertation is concerned.  Nevertheless, the sleeper effect does set important precedents.  It 
shows that people attend to the source of received information, and that the attributes of those 
sources (such as credibility) have consequences for attitude and judgment.  It points up the need 
for a taxonomy of source characteristics (e.g., is credibility distinct from age and authority?), and 
thereby a consideration of parameter values that vary from one source to another and from one 
context to another.  Where fluctuations in judgment or opinion are concerned, it points an 
implicating finger at source memory, and emphasizes the question of whether encoding, storage, 
and retrieval of source information is qualitatively or quantitatively different from the encoding, 
storage, and retrieval of other forms of information (such as propositional content).  Finally, the 
long-standing ties between sleeper effect research and real-world domains such as politics and 
advertising cast a long, pragmatic shadow over the implications to be wrought from all of these 
considerations of source processing: findings from additional studies promise to be immediately 
relevant outside the lab.   
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Source Monitoring 
Another domain of research that may seem to contain obvious connections to the present 
studies is the area of “source monitoring” (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & 
Raye, 1981; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000).  The source monitoring framework was established in 
the 1970s (originally under the rubric of “reality monitoring,” Johnson & Raye, 1981) with a 
general interest in how the mind keeps track of the when, where, and how of our experiences 
(and their mnemonic traces), without plunging into a well of catastrophic errors that might easily 
accompany a cognitive system faced with such a daunting computational challenge. Source 
memory within this framework is broadly construed to mean how the many elements of a 
person’s experience (i.e., “where and when [events] happen, the perceptual properties of the 
people and objects involved, what was said, the emotional state of participants, our 
interpretations of what happened,” etc.) are cobbled together, stored, and later reconstructed from 
memory (Johnson, Verfaellie, & Dunlosky, 2008).   
Research within this domain often considers questions of reality monitoring (e.g., 
distinguishing something we only imagined from something we actually did) and source 
monitoring (e.g., distinguishing an action we merely observed from one we personally 
performed), along with related phenomena such as imagination inflation (where confidence in 
the reality of a counterfactual event grows or “inflates” after repeatedly imagining it; see Garry 
& Polaschek, 2000).  
An emphasis on reconstruction abides this research, in that the focus falls upon on 
processes of attribution rather than specific memory for source information per se.  The idea is 
that we use the details of our recollections (e.g., amount of perceptual detail) to make source 
inferences (e.g., whether a given memory is of an event we only imagined or one we actually 
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experienced).  “People’s mental experiences do not have labels indicating where they came from. 
Rather, they make attributions about the sources on the basis of the characteristics of those 
mental experiences—qualities like perceptual, contextual, semantic, and emotional details—and 
records of the cognitive operations that created them” (Johnson, 2006, p. 761). 
However, this program of research is one that has not generally assessed the veracity of 
information depending on whether it came from Person X or Person Y (Johnson, 2006).  For 
example, studies of reality monitoring were concerned with “source” information such as context 
or semantic content, but this was construed to mean things such as spatial and temporal details of 
an occurrence (in the case of context) rather than details of a communicator, and identity of the 
information itself (in the case of semantic content) rather than the conceptual status of a 
communicator (see Johnson & Raye, 1981).  As such, the issues addressed in this dissertation 
may be seen to fall under the large umbrella of source monitoring, and therefore a contribution 
thereto, though only indirectly informed by the extant research there.  Still, the source 
monitoring framework captures many of the same interests with which the studies here are 
concerned.  Johnson and Raye (1981) expressed: “in emphasizing the many transformations a 
stimulus might undergo [from encoding to retrieval], we run the danger of forgetting the dire 
functional implications of a memory system that is assumed to be so loosely tied to external 
events” (p. 69).    
Developmental of Trust 
While the influence of specific sources has been traditionally omitted from the source 
memory literature mentioned above, the inclusion of source information has been common in 
child development studies of trust in testimony.  These studies take as their starting point the 
observation that most of the information acquired by children during their formative years is 
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procured not from first-hand experience but from the testimony of family and caregivers around 
them. This raises the question of how children decide whom to trust, when to trust, how much to 
trust, and under what circumstances to trust.   
Studies in this area have revealed that preschool children (ages 3-4) are in fact reliably 
able to consider source information when making judgments about newly communicated 
information (for a review, see Harris, 2007; Heyman, 2008).  For example, when faced with two 
different sources, one of which consistently labels common objects accurately and another which 
consistently labels them inaccurately, children will “trust” the more reliable informant when 
these same sources later offer novel labels for novel objects.  That is, children distinguish 
credible from non-credible sources and use this discrimination as a basis for epistemic decision-
making (Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004).  They also retain these discriminations when tested a 
week later (Corriveau & Harris, 2009).   Children attend to the age of a source as well and are 
able to make nuanced judgments based on age, preferring to trust adult sources over child 
sources, but switching that preference if a child proves a more reliable informant than the adult 
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006).  Very young children also seem to understand and attend to the fact that 
some sources may have more knowledge than others (Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999).   
However, other studies suggest that young children’s epistemic abilities, though 
impressive, leave room for growth.  For example, children of kindergarten age or younger may 
not always take into account the biasing nature of source motives (Mills & Keil, 2005), even 
when those motives are made clear and distinct (Heyman & Legare, 2005).  Despite these 
qualifications, it is nonetheless clear that children exhibit some sophistication when it comes to 
considering the source of encountered information, and to some extent these considerations are 
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able to influence judgment and decision-making.  Paul Harris (2007) summarizes the prevailing 
view from these studies:  
“We assume that children will use a variety of cues by which to appraise an 
informant and that each [cue] is likely to add to or subtract from some overall 
reservoir of trust. . . . We conjecture that young children, disposed as they are to 
rely on the testimony of others, also establish a cognitive profile of their 
informants – they form a global impression of each individual, regarding some as 
more epistemically trustworthy than others. We assume that this global 
impression regarding any given informant is based on some kind of aggregated 
metric. Information about the informant’s past inaccuracy, ignorance, uncertainty, 
or apparent idiosyncrasy is fed into that profile” (p. 138).   
 
If such processing descriptions are true of children, they must apply to adults as well.   
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to begin charting whether source profiles affect 
automatic belief.    
How Mental Systems “Believe” 
As noted earlier, the line of research that directly informs the present experiments is 
centered on “how we believe” (Gilbert, 1991).  Previous research has suggested that when people 
initially encounter a new piece of information (e.g., by reading a sentence), there is no immediate 
distinction between comprehending and evaluating—that is, at the outset of an encounter with 
new information, we believe what we comprehend as an automatic epistemic default, and only 
later (if time and attention permit) submit that information to a second and more controlled 
evaluation where we confirm or reform our (pre)suppositions.  This conclusion has emerged 
from studies showing that people more often recall false statements as true (not vice versa) if 
interrupted when learning whether a statement is true or false (Gilbert, et al., 1990; Gilbert, et al., 
1993; though see Hasson, Simmons, & Todorov, 2005).  Interruption ostensibly precludes 
effortful processing of a statement’s truth, thereby allowing us to tease apart comprehension and 
evaluation to reveal the dispositions of belief that precede explicit appraisal.  So if we 
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automatically believe that new information is true, then interrupting subjects as they learn that a 
statement is false should reveal a later tendency to rate such interrupted statements as true 
(relative to statements that were not interrupted).    
Consider one representative study (the “Hopi Language” experiment, Gilbert et al., 
1990), in which participants saw a series of statements, one at a time, that nominally taught them 
Hopi Indian vocabulary words (e.g., “A ghoren is a jug” or “A monishna is a star”), followed by 
an indication of whether the statement was true or false (or else a blank screen that offered no 
information).  On some of these trials, participants also heard an interrupting tone while reading 
TRUE or FALSE, and were required to press a button to register their recognition.  This tone 
was intended to distract participants, producing a cognitive load that compromised their 
epistemic processing of the statement (i.e., whether it was true or false).  Later, at test, they saw 
these statements again, and were asked to recall whether each had been true, false, had not been 
followed by any information, or was new.  
Though our experience may intuitively suggest that we can comprehend a statement 
without necessarily judging its veracity, Gilbert’s results implied that the mind categorized 
information as true by default when interruption prevented controlled, explicit processing.  When 
subjects were asked to recall the truth of statements seen earlier, they made the same number of 
errors on both true and false uninterrupted trials (recalling “true” statements as “false” as often 
as they recalled “false” statements as “true”).  But for statements that were interrupted, subjects 
were more likely to mis-remember false statements as true, than true statements as false).  It was 
this interaction, where the rate of true/false reversals depended on interruption, that gave force to 
the notion that the mind was bent toward an automatic presumption of truth (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Accurate identification (left half) and reversal of statement truth (right half) from the Hopi Language 
experiment (Gilbert et al., 1990). “T as T” refers to true statements correctly recalled as “true” (vice versa for “F as 
F”), while “T as F” refers to originally true statements incorrectly recalled as “false” (vice versa for “F as T”).  
 
But as previously noted, these original studies (and those that followed) did not consider 
the source of the information presented.  Indeed, no information about the source was provided 
at all.  Participants in these studies saw statements emerge on a computer screen ex nihilo.  
Although the absence of source information might be typical of experimental settings, such 
circumstances mark a conspicuous departure from the way people normally encounter 
information.   
Scope & Rationale of the Proposed Research 
The absence of source information in the foregoing experiments by Gilbert and 
colleagues ensured that an arguably unnatural form of processing would occur in those studies.  
If the human mind evolved in a context where language-communicated information almost 
always had a source, it is reasonable to imagine that the human mind would contain evolved 
processing systems that prepare it for content coming from different sources (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2000).  For this reason, the discontinuity between previous research protocols and 
naturalistic information-processing is an omission worthy of exploration.  
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The consideration of ancestral sociality and the fitness-loaded coalitional dynamics 
discussed earlier may make a default assumption of truth a dangerously vulnerable design for our 
cognitive apparatus.  As noted by Kenrick and colleagues (Kenrick, Sadalla, & Keefe, 1998, p. 
497), “From an evolutionary perspective, it makes no sense to consider cognitive processes 
independently of other processes such as motivation, emotion, or behavior; all are interrelated 
parts of adaptive systems designed to deal with functional problems.”  We expect the inclusion 
of source information—specifically, coalitionally charged source information—to change the 
qualilty of one’s cognitive processing.  Processing a statement in isolation from source may 
engage a number of mechanisms evaluating plausibility, relevance, etc., but the inclusion of 
source information may also engage processes concerned with signal evaluation.  When a person 
chooses to verbalize, it almost always carries a communicative intent (people infrequently 
choose to speak for no purpose, or speak on accident).  “[Language] behaviors are obviously 
signals because they serve little or no purpose outside of communication” (Andrews, 2001, p. 
19).  It is this intentional quality that requires humans to process not just the objective content of 
a statement, but also the latent communicative intent of the source (Sperber & Wilson, 1996).  
That is, the inclusion of source information may elicit signal processing that is distinct from 
content processing, and when the source is coalitionally significant we might expect such 
processing to reveal evidence of epistemic vigilance.   
The present studies bring these considerations into the realm of default belief.  Following 
the protocol used by Gilbert and colleagues (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993), we attach 
coalitional source information to presented statements, affording an opportunity for coalitional 
source processing to affect automatic belief.  Such a design allows for full processing of both the 
source information and the statement content, while interruption truncates one’s processing of 
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statement veracity.  Under such (interrupted) conditions, we hypothesize that the relative rate of 
true/false reversals will reflect coalition-contingent differences.  The rationale, simply, is that in 
the absence of epistemic certainty (which interruption prevents), it would make adaptive sense 
for one’s mental architecture to affirm coalitional affiliations by presuming truth for statements 
issued by one’s best friends, but not for statements from someone least liked.   
Two qualifications should be noted.  First, this hypothesis does not speak to un-
interrupted trials.  It is possible that the full attention afforded by uninterrupted trials may elicit 
explicit, controlled coalitional processing for either source.  It is also possible that full attention 
will allow subjects to discount source information due to the artificial setting.  These possibilities 
are tangential, insofar as the project is geared to an examination of how automatic processes of 
belief might be spontaneously re-calibrated in light of the source.   
Second, despite the important threats that attend an enemy, this hypothesis makes no 
specific prediction that reversal rates will change for enemies.  One might imagine that always 
disbelieving an enemy might be a good default strategy as a guard against deception and a 
demonstration of non-affiliation.  But such a strategy may leave one as vulnerable as always 
believing, since deceptive communication is rarely so careless or blunt as to exclude a truthful 
premise or context.  The sophistication of deception would likely vary from enemy to enemy 
(along with age, intelligence, general knowledge, etc.), such that no alternative strategy would 
have been favored by natural selection for information encountered from a categorical enemy.  
However, where positive coalitional alliances are concerned (friends, partners, etc.), sheer 
accuracy is not always the concern of most importance.  Coalitional alliance is concerned with 
the provisioning of social support.  Under circumstances of epistemic uncertainty (as caused by 
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interruption), judgment of a statement’s “truth” may not only engage processes of automatic 
belief, but also processes of social cognition supporting coalitional affirmation and endorsement.   
A series of pilot studies were conducted to make sure that the experimental protocol used 
by Gilbert and colleagues would be amenable to modification, specifically that the manipulation 
of source as an additional factor would be feasible.  What these pilot studies also demonstrate is 
that the inclusion of source information in these research paradigms can drive distinctive patterns 
of recall and error.   
In the context of Gilbert’s comprehension/evaluation paradigm (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1990), 
in which both accuracy (recalling true statements as true, and false statements as false) and 
reversals (recalling true statements as false, or false statements as true) are used as dependent 
measures, we found that attaching sources to statements (by presenting the names of participants’ 
“best friend” and the person they “least like” alongside the statements) disrupted the pattern of 
errors found in the original studies.  Notably, however, using a different set of sources in the 
same paradigm (e.g., a fictional professor at a nearby university, or a school-aged child) did not 
disrupt the pattern.  These preliminary findings suggest the possibility that (a) different sources 
may have different epistemic profiles, (b) sources with different epistemic profiles may influence 
the way that communicated information is processed, and (c) qualitative or quantitative 
differences in observed processing across sources may reflect a form of epistemic vigilance—
that is, cognition aimed at minimizing the cost of inferential errors.   
Pilot Experiment 1 
This first pilot experiment was designed to (a) verify that we could replicate the original 
findings by Gilbert and colleagues while (b) using a similar but not identical set of stimuli.  
Planning to add Source as a factor in forthcoming studies necessitated a stimulus set larger than 
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that used in Gilbert’s original studies, and one amenable to maintaining power through an 
increased number of repeated-measures. 
This experiment follows the protocol of Gilbert’s (Gilbert et al., 1990) Experiment 1.  
From his model of how initial truth judgments are formed, one should expect an asymmetry in 
the proportion of statements recalled as true or false as a result of interruption.  Specifically, 
interruption should cause participants to misremember false statements as true more often than 
true statements as false (with no asymmetry on interruption-free trials). From a “believe-first” 
perspective, this would occur because interruption had precluded the cognitive operations of 
“unbelieving” that are required for a person to change their default assumption of “true” to an 
updated belief that a statement is “false.”   
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two WU undergraduates (21 female, 11 male), with a mean age 
19.81 years, participated for course credit.  All participants were native English speakers. 
Materials. Fifty-six trivia statements served as the communication stimuli, along with 
indications of statement veracity (“TRUE,” “FALSE,” or no information) and a 500hz tone for 
interruption.  Statements contained trivia/opinion content sufficiently arcane to be outside the 
normal range of common knowledge, which prevented participants from assessing the truth of 
statements prior to experimental suggestion (see Appendix A for full stimulus list).  
Representative examples include:  
“The first postage stamp was introduced by Great Britain in 1840, and featured a portrait of Queen 
Victoria.” 
“’Syzygy’ is the term for three celestial bodies arranged in a straight line, as during an eclipse 
where the Sun, Moon, and Earth are aligned.”  
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“The requirement among American universities that printed dissertations be single-sided wastes 
40 million pages of paper every year.” 
“The first genetically engineered organism was a tobacco plant in 1983, grown in Wisconsin and 
designed to be resistant to key herbicides.” 
Stimuli were presented on personal computers, centered horizontally and vertically.  
Stimulus length was controlled, so that each statement appeared in a single line (no instances of 
text-wrapping).   
Design and procedure. Participants were individually seated at a private computer and 
fitted with headphones to ensure privacy of the interrupting tone. An instruction screen informed 
participants that they were involved in an experiment on basic aspects of communication, and 
that they were to pay attention to what was said and whether it was true or false.  They were also 
told that because interruption is a regular feature of normal communication, they would 
occasionally hear an interrupting tone, at which point they should press the “P” key to register 
their awareness of the tone.   
An initial study phase consisted of 48 trivia statements presented in random order.  
Following the “Hopi Language” experiment, each statement appeared on-screen for 8 seconds, 
followed by a 2-second inter-stimulus-interval (blank screen), followed by a 3-second 
presentation of statement truth (“TRUE” or “FALSE”) or no information (blank white screen).  
A final inter-stimulus-interval of 1 second provided a buffer between trials (14 second sum per 
trial).  Among the 48 study statements, 20 were randomly labeled as “true” and 20 as “false,” and 
8 received no truth information (blank screen).     
Among the 40 trials specified as true or false, interruption occurred for 16 (8 true, 8 
false).  Following Gilbert, this was achieved using a 500hz tone, which sounded 750ms after the 
initial appearance of truth (“TRUE” or “FALSE”) and lasted 390ms.  Subjects were given an 
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instruction to press the “P” key whenever the tone occurred.  The function of the tone, as in the 
original study, was to disrupt participants’ processing of truth information.   
The study phase was followed by a 15 second break, after which the test phase 
automatically began. During the test phase, participants were presented with 56 statements (the 
48 previously viewed, plus 8 new statements) in random order, and asked to recall whether each 
statement was (a) true, (b) false, (c) had no information provided, or (d) was new (not presented 
during the study phase). The test was self-paced, and decisions were rendered by key-press 
(“true,” “false,” “new,” or “no information” were labeled as “T,” “F,” “N,” “I” on the 0-3 buttons 
of the keyboard number pad). 
Results and Discussion 
The proportion of statements that each subject accurately recalled as true or false was 
submitted to a 2 (Truth: true or false) x 2 (Interruption: yes or no) within-subjects ANOVA. This 
analysis did not reveal a main effect of Truth, F(l,31) = 1.47, p = .234, but did reveal a main 
effect of Interruption, F(l,31) = 25.74, p < .001, p
2
 = .45, and a significant Truth x Interruption 
interaction, F(l,31) = 5.98, p = .02, p
2
 = .16. The left half of Figure 6 illustrates that interruption 
reduced accuracy for false statements (61% vs. 39%), as expected, to drive an increase false 
statements erroneously recalled as true.  
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Figure 6. Accurate identification (left half) and reversal of statement truth (right half) in Pilot Study 1 (compare with 
the analogous data of Gilbert, et al., 1990, in Figure 5). “T as T” refers to true statements correctly recalled as “true” 
(vice versa for “F as F”), while “T as F” refers to originally true statements incorrectly recalled as “false” (vice versa 
for “F as T”).  
 
A second ANOVA was performed using “reversals” as the dependent measure, defined 
as the percentage of true statements erroneously recalled as false, and false statements 
erroneously recalled as true. This analysis revealed a main effect of Truth, F(l,31) = 7.51, p = 
.010, p
2
 = .20, and a main effect of Interruption, F(l,31) = 4.28, p = .047, p
2
 = .12, as well as 
the expected Truth x Interruption interaction, F(l,31) = 6.17, p = .019, p
2
 = .17. The right half 
of Figure 6 shows the percentage of reversals for true and false statements, and illustrates that 
false statements were affected by interruption much more than true statements. Interruption 
while reading that a statement was “false” was much more likely to lead to an epistemic reversal 
(21.5%) than interruption on a statement labeled as “true” (9.8%). Thus, interruption drove an 
increase in the error rates of false statements, t(31) = 3.88, p = .001, but this asymmetry did not 
exist for uninterrupted trials (t < 1), consistent with the interpretation that truth judgments are 
governed by belief dynamics that assume initial truth.  
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The results of this first experiment suggest that both of its aims were satisfied: the 
findings from Gilbert et al.’s (1990) “believe first” experiments were replicated, and this was 
accomplished using a novel set of stimuli. If the inclusion of source information proves to affect 
subsequent results, we therefore have reason to consider that neither the stimulus set nor the 
basic protocol are the root cause.  
Pilot Experiment 2 
Having replicated the original Gilbert findings using the alternative content of trivia 
statements, this second pilot experiment began to explore the question central to epistemic 
vigilance: To what extent does the source matter?  Gilbert’s “believe first, unbelieve later” 
hypothesis is a prediction about general information processing, so there is no reason (on his 
account) to expect source information to influence what are nominally automatic processes.  But 
if mechanisms of epistemic vigilance exist, we might expect their influence to emerge when 
coalitional sources become involved.  Here we extend the protocol of the previous experiment by 
introducing the variable of “source”—asking participants to conceive that the statements they 
confront originate from either their “best friend” or the person they “least like.”  
Method 
Participants. Thirty-seven WU undergraduates (20 female, 17 male), all native English 
speakers, with a mean age 19.16 years, participated for course credit.   
Materials. The materials were identical to those of Pilot Experiment 1, with the sole 
addition of source information: participants’ “best friend” and a “least liked” individual. Stimuli 
were presented as before, with source information centered just above the trivia statements, for 
example: 
John said that: 
“The first postage stamp was introduced by Great Britain in 1840, featuring a portrait of Queen Victoria.” 
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Design and procedure. The design and procedure were identical to that of Pilot 
Experiment 1, with the following modification. After each participant was seated at their 
computer, they were asked to type out the first name of the person they considered their “best 
friend,” and then the person that they “least liked.”  In the few cases where participants asked for 
clarification, “best friend” was qualified to mean the friend they “most trust” while “least liked” 
was qualified to mean someone they “least trust.”  They were also told that the sources had to be 
“real,” that is, people they actually knew (as opposed to, for example, President George W. 
Bush).  In most cases, the names of appropriate individuals came effortlessly to the participants.  
The names of these real sources were typed into the experimental software (SuperLab), so that 
statement presentations during the study phase were paired with the names of these two sources.  
Each study trial thus began with one of the two sources (e.g., “John said that” or “Megan said 
that”) printed concurrently above the trivia statement.  Half of the 48 statements were randomly 
paired with the “best friend” and the other half with the “least-liked” source.     
Participants received the same study instructions as Pilot Experiment 1, amended only to 
say that they would see statements by people they knew, and that they should pay close attention 
to what was said, who said it, and whether it was true or false. The test phase was fully identical 
to the test of Experiment 1.   
Results and Discussion 
Does knowledge of source make a difference? We submitted the proportion of statements 
accurately recalled to a 2 (Truth) x 2 (Interruption) x 2 (Source) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Significant main effects emerged for Truth, F(1,36) = 10.92, p = .002, p
2
 = .23, Interruption, 
F(1,36) = 5.06, p = .031, p
2
 = .12, and marginally for Source, F(1,36) = 3.16, p = .084, p
2
 = 
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.08, as well as for the Interruption x Source interaction, F(1,36) = 21.02, p < .001, p
2
 = .37 (all 
other effects n.s.). 
This ANOVA was then repeated using reversals as the dependent measure, which 
revealed significant main effects for Source, F(1,36) = 5.12, p = .030, p
2
 = .13, and Truth, 
F(1,36) = 29.26, p < .001, p
2
 = .45, as well as two significant interactions, Interruption x Truth, 
F(1,36) = 8.59, p = .006, p
2
 = .19, and Interruption x Source, F(1,36) = 6.31, p < .017, p
2
 = .15.  
While the analyses of Pilot Experiment 1 suggest that the “believe first” effect is robust, 
the source-inclusive analyses of Pilot Experiment 2 suggest that a more subtle interpretation is 
required. Figures 7A and 7B show the data for best friends and least-liked sources individually. 
When the source was the least-liked individual, the results show a preserved pattern of assuming 
initial truth (as in Pilot Experiment 1 and previous studies: compare with Figures 5 and 6), but 
when the source was a best friend, that pattern was disrupted.  
 7A (Best Friend) 
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 Figure 7B (Least-Liked) 
 
Figures 7A / 7B. Accurate identification (left half) and reversal of statement truth (right half) in Pilot Experiment 2 
for Best Friend (7A) and Least-Liked (7B).  (Compare with the analogous data—without sources—from Gilbert et 
al., 1990). 
 
For least-liked sources, interruption reduced accurate recall for false statements (32%) 
relative to true statements (51%), t(36) = 2.67, p = .01. This change is in-step with previous 
findings, the change thought to drive the rise in false-to-true reversals. But this change was only 
marginally significant for best friend sources (58% vs 46%), t(36) = 1.84, p = .074 (two-tailed), 
for whom the proportion of false-to-true reversals did not increase with interruption. While it 
is true that the data for both sources show that being interrupted provokes more F-as-T epistemic 
reversals—the expected asymmetry, t(36) = 4.12, p < .001 (least-liked), t(36) = 3.46, p = .001 
(best friend)—the characteristics of the best friend data challenge this as a complete account.  
Perhaps disconcertingly, these data seem to suggest that information coming from 
individuals we sharply dislike is processed no differently than when there is no source at all (in 
the present experimental context). Conversely, Figure 7A illustrates that information coming 
from best friends is comparatively impervious to the affects of interruption, with the singular 
exception of a lowered tendency to make T-as-F reversals. Do these data suggest an epistemic 
privilege when processing information from good friends?  It may, and the dissertation 
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experiments to be conducted will pursue this possibility.  But first, Experiment 3 was conducted 
to find out whether other important epistemic variables might disrupt the standard pattern of 
recall as well.  
Pilot Experiment 3 
How do we know that the observed recall differences were a function of coalitional status 
and not a function of differences in, for example, reliability or trustworthiness—traits that vary 
quantitatively among coalitional and non-coalitional sources alike.  For evolutionary reasons, we 
would expect coalitional status to have cognitive import independent of source characteristics 
such as general knowledge, experience, likeability, and so on.  To advance this hypothesis and 
qualify the previous results, tests must show that any results proffering coalitional interpretations 
cannot be accounted for by alternative, more mundane factors.  Toward this end, a final pilot 
experiment replaced BF and LL sources with two non-coalitional sources—a college professor 
and a school-aged child.  Though lacking coalitional affiliation, these sources could be expected 
to vary in terms of potentially relevant source dimensions such as age, general knowledge, 
authority, and reliability.  If the results of our earlier source manipulations were rooted in non-
coalitional causes, we should expect recall and reversal outcomes here to present similarly 
divergent patterns of recall for these new sources.  On the other hand, if results for these new 
sources are indistinguishable, there would be less reason to think that the non-coalitional factors 
itemized above carry the explanatory power to account for the results of Pilot Experiment 2.   
Method 
Participants. 26 WU undergraduates (19 female, 7 male), all native English speakers, 
with a mean age 18.65 years, participated for course credit.   
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Materials. The materials of this study were fully identical to those of Pilot Experiment 2, 
with changes limited to source names and initial instructions.   
Design and procedure. The design and procedure of this experiment did not deviate 
from that of Pilot Experiment 2, with two exceptions.  First, participants were no longer asked to 
type in the names of sources; instead, the fictional names of a college professor (“Dr. Johnson”) 
and an eight-year old child (“Thomas”) were programmed into the experimental script and not 
allowed to vary.  Second, the instructions were modified to accommodate the new source 
information.  These instructions read: 
This experiment is concerned with the dynamics of basic communication.  You will see a number 
of trivia statements made by either Dr. Johnson (a memory psychologist at a respected university) 
or Thomas (an eight-year-old child from a nearby school).  Some of these statements will be 
followed by an indication of whether the statement is true or false.  Please pay close attention to 
WHAT is said, WHO said it, and whether it is TRUE or FALSE.  
The rest of the instructions (regarding interruption, etc.) were not changed, and the test 
instructions and procedure were the same as before.   
Results and Discussion 
Data from two participants were removed from analysis because of a failure to press the 
“P” key in response to the interrupting tone, thereby making it impossible to properly gauge the 
effect of interruption for these subjects. Using data from the remaining 24 subjects, we once 
again submitted both accuracy and reversal measures to 2 (Truth) x 2 (Interruption) x 2 (Source) 
ANOVAs. Looking first at accuracy, main effects emerged for Truth, F(1,23) = 15.94, p = .001, 
p
2
 = .41, and Interruption, F(1,23) = 7.05, p = .014, p
2
 = .24, but no other effects or 
interactions were significant. Turning to reversals, the same picture emerged, showing main 
effects of Interruption, F(1,23) = 5.61, p = .027, p
2
 = .20, and Truth, F(1,23) = 29.97, p < .001, 
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p
2
 = .57, and a Truth x Interruption interaction, F(1,23) = 8.39, p = .008, p
2
 = .27, but no main 
effect or contingent interactions involving Source.  
Figures 8A and 8B show the data for Professor (8A) and Child (8B).  These results show 
that the “truth bias” can be replicated using two novel sources, and the failure of any main effect 
or interaction involving Source suggests a total absence of meaningful differences between the 
two sources used (in terms of the measures of this study).  Equally important, a comparison of 
these results with those of the previous experiment warrants the tentative conclusion that there is 
a meaningful difference between sources that carry coalitional relevance and those that do not.  
Although the findings of this experiment do not confirm a coalitional interpretation of source 
effects, they are in line with one, and they suggest that factors such as authority and general 
knowledge were not the ones driving previous recall differences among coalitional sources.   
 Figure 8A (Professor) 
 
Epistemic vigilance 
 36 
 Figure 8B (Child) 
 
Figures 8a / 8b. Percentage of statements accurately recalled (or incorrectly reversed) as a function of statement 
truth and interruption, for Professor (8A) and Child (8B).  
 
Introduction to Dissertation Experiments 
The set of hypotheses explored below consider the possibility that the human mind 
contains prophylactic processes which evolved to accomplish epistemic vigilance in light of the 
adaptive social challenges that humans faced under ancestral conditions, specifically those 
concerned with the management of coalitional affiliations.   
The preceding pilot studies provided initial evidence consistent with a coalitional 
interpretation.  When trivia statements appeared to come from coalitional proxies (one’s best 
friend or the person one least likes), patterns of recall and error differed for the two sources.  
Specifically, when the source was one’s best friend, interrupted subjects were more likely to mis-
remember false statements as true, and less likely to mis-remember true statements as false—a 
result that did not occur with sources other than best friends.    
To attribute this difference to coalitional factors, however, requires additional support 
and theoretical refinement.  Other plausible explanations must be ruled out, and three 
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possibilities will be explored here.  First, it is important to know whether subjects actually recall 
the sources for each statement.  By its nature, a coalitional interpretation presumes that a 
mnemonic link has been formed between source and truth.  A study that requires judgments of 
both source and truth should reveal links between the two.  (A related but secondary interest lies 
in knowing whether a recalled source—accurate or not—influences judgments of truth, and 
conversely whether recalled validity—accurate or not—influences judgments of source.)   
Second, although the last pilot experiment spoke against the import of authority and 
knowledgability (insofar as default belief is concerned), it is possible that the coalitional 
interpretation can be better accounted for through the simple difference in valence attached to 
best friend and least-liked sources.  That is, perhaps any two sources distinguished by a sharp 
positive/negative contrast will produce a difference in recall comparable to those found for best 
friends and disliked individuals.   
Third, it would be useful to know whether the effect of the BF/LL manipulation 
generalizes to statements beyond trivia, statements that carry more real-world relevance.  For 
example, the use of precautionary statements (e.g., regarding health or physical danger) would 
not only improve ecological validity but also assess whether a meaningful relationship exists 
between coalitional agents and statements nominally affecting one’s welfare.  These three 
proposals are explored in turn.   
Experiment 1: Recalling the Source 
Asking participants to judge the truth and the source of a statement introduces unique 
opportunities.  Asking for judgments of truth and source about a single statement is a natural 
juxtaposition that allows us to see to what extent these judgments hang together.  If memory for 
truth is independent of memory for source, then the functional argument of the present studies 
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can be reasonably called into question.  Although it is possible that source/truth effects exist 
more at an implicit level than an explicit level, it is unlikely that implicit effects would not also 
produce some discernible patterns within explicit recall.  As such, the details of source memory 
may provide meaningful qualifications to the patterns of recall demonstrated for truth alone.   
However, new challenges of interpretation accompany this revised protocol.  The order in 
which judgments are requested becomes important, since responses in the first half of a test trial 
may affect decisions in the second half.  If a statement’s truth is queried first, then the test trial is 
ostensibly similar to the test trials of previous studies (which asked exclusively for statement 
veracity), and thus represents an opportunity to replicate the original results.  Conversely, if a 
statement’s source is queried first, this should provide a relatively pure measure of source 
memory.   
But predictions for the second half of each test trial are more difficult to articulate, 
because responses provided for the first half may elicit implicit effects, explicit recollection, and 
any idiosyncratic processing uniquely provoked by a given statement.  A number of interesting 
predictions may be articulated regarding the potential interaction of implicit and controlled 
influences, but these are not strictly relevant to the issue of automatic belief.
1
   
For those subjects who are first queried about statement truth, results are predicted to 
show a replication of the results from Pilot Experiment 2, where least-liked individuals show the 
                                               
1
 For example, a reasonable prediction might be that initial source judgments would bias subsequent truth 
responses irrespective of whether those initial source judgments were accurate—e.g., statements that are 
first judged to have come from a best friend would be more often recalled as true than statements first 
judged to have come from an enemy, even if those initial source judgments were wrong.  Such results 
would be akin to findings in the study of the “truth effect,” where respondents judge statements as having 
greater validity when they are perceived to have been repeated, even when they weren’t (Bacon, 1979).  
But again, such predictions would not speak to the issue of default belief with which these studies are 
concerned, because each secondary judgment is always the product of both signal (implicit associations 
between source, statement, and validity) and noise (ancillary and potentially controlled processes 
engendered by making the first judgment).   
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same pattern of automatic belief as when no source is present, but best friends show a pattern 
that is biased towards truth—interruption produces an increased rate of reversals from false-to-
true, and a decreased rate of reversals from true-to-false.   
For those subjects who are first queried about source memory, it is predicted that results 
will show approximately equal rates of source accuracy for those trials that were not interrupted.  
But for those statements that were interrupted, the prediction is that results will show a slight 
bias towards recalling one’s best friend as the source instead of one’s LL person.  This might 
seem like a counter-intuitive prediction in light of the fact that source-statement pairings 
themselves are never interrupted (only the processing of truth information is interrupted), and if a 
truth bias is the only process operating, then interruption should not influence recall rates of 
source (both should be approximately equal, or 50%, whether interrupted or not).  But if a bias 
towards coalitional support is operating as well, we might expect (under interrupted conditions) 
that the default presumption of truth will facilitate or bias source memory toward one’s best 
friend (adaptive congruency), but not towards enemies.   
In addition, one might reasonably predict asymmetries among the reaction times for 
source and truth judgments.  If a “support bias” exists for best friends, then reaction times (for 
both truth and source judgments) should be quickest when a statement pairs a best friend with 
truth (adaptive congruency), and slower reaction times when the best friend is associated with 
falsity.  Furthermore, interruption should amplify these differences to the extent that it 
successfully minimizes the influence of explicit recollection.  No such RT differences are 
anticipated for statements from least-liked individuals, because no clear adaptive benefits would 
have accrued to a default presumption of truth or falsity for enemies, as it would for best friends.   
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Method 
Participants.  Seventy-three Washington University undergraduates (39 female, 34 
male), all native English speakers, with a mean age of 19.5 years, participated for course credit.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-group conditions: one group 
receiving test questions in the order of source judgment then validity judgment for each 
individual statement (no blocking) at test (Group A, N = 40), the other group receiving test 
questions in the opposite order (Group B, N = 33).  
Materials.  The same 56 trivia statements used in the pilot experiments served as 
communication stimuli (see Appendix A), along with the same indications of validity (TRUE, 
FALSE, or no information), the 500hz tone for interruption, and source names determined by 
participants (friends and enemies).  Stimuli were presented on personal computers, centered 
horizontally and vertically, with source information appearing just above the statements.  
Stimulus length was controlled, so that each statement appeared in a single line, with no 
instances of text-wrapping.   
Design and procedure.  The design and procedure of the study phase was identical to 
that of Pilot Experiment 2, with the exception that the presentation of truth information (TRUE 
or FALSE) was flashed for only 500ms instead of 2000ms.  Because the original Gilbert 
procedure left the truth stimulus onscreen for a full two seconds, this may have allowed the 
quickest responders (those pressing the “P” key immediately upon hearing the tone) an 
opportunity to return their attention to the validity stimulus before it left the screen.  (Informal 
monitoring of pilot participants suggested that this occurred at least some of the time, with 
participants occasionally placing an expectant finger on the P key, whereupon the interrupting 
tone would only have diverted attention for a fraction of a second.)  Such circumstances render 
Epistemic vigilance 
 41 
the tone somewhat less suited to its task of interruption.  Reducing the on-screen time of the 
validity stimulus is therefore intended to guard against the return of attention, making sustained 
awareness of validity more difficult, and thereby, it is hoped, augmenting the critical division 
between comprehension and evaluation upon which these studies are based.   
The test phase also diverged slightly from the previous studies by including judgments of 
both truth and source.  Once again the test phase included previously presented statements (along 
with eight new filler statements), but in addition to judging whether a statement had been 
presented as true or false, participants were now asked to also recall which source had “made” 
the statement (their best friend or their least-liked acquaintance).  The order of these two 
questions (truth and source) was counter-balanced as a between-subjects manipulation.  The 
rationale for the less economical between-subjects approach is that the number of critical 
interrupted trials was already relatively small (sixteen, with eight per source), so that a within-
subjects manipulation (e.g. two blocks of test trials, with order of questions counter-balanced 
across blocks) would require sacrificing resolution in the data (fewer repeated-measures per 
condition) or else a considerable increase in the number of study statements and test trials.  
Neither compromise was deemed more important than maintaining continuity with previous 
experiments, such that a between-subjects approach was adopted.   
Results 
Due to inattention and/or a failure to follow directions, data for six participants were 
removed prior to analysis—two from Group A where source memory was queried first, and four 
from Group B where statement validity was queried first—leaving data from 67 participants 
available for analysis (38 from Group A, 29 from Group B).  Across these 67 participants, 
overall source accuracy was good (M = .69, SE = .02, range = .43 to .93) and significantly above 
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chance (.50), t(66) = 12.85, p < .001.  This held at the individual level as well: given a .50 
probability of success on each of the 48 test trials that were originally paired with a source (BF 
or LL), recall rates that equaled or exceeded 63% (via binomial calculation) would have 
qualified as above-chance performance.  Using this criterion, 50 of the 67 participants (75%) 
performed at above-chance levels, and only one subject scored lower than .50 (.43).  This 
indicates that most participants were able to recall source information reasonably well within the 
constraints of the modified experimental protocol.  Recall for statement truth was also good (M = 
.56, SE = .02, range = .30 to .78) and above chance, t(66) = 21.09, p < .001.  In this case, given a 
.25 probability of success on each of the 40 test trials that had originally been tagged with truth 
information (the four response choices at test being true, false, no information, or new), 38% 
accuracy or higher would have qualified as above-chance performance; 63 of the 67 participants 
(94%) met this criterion.  However, given that recognition memory alone would have been fairly 
sufficient to eliminate “new” responses as a competitive option for these 40 test trials, a more 
stringent level of chance probability (.33) may be more appropriate.  At this more conservative 
level (requiring 47% accuracy), 51 of the 67 participants (76%) still met or exceeded this success 
rate.
2
  Taken together, these recall data indicate that the protocol employed in the present 
experiment—modified from the foregoing studies by adding source judgment alongside truth 
judgment—did not place deleterious demands on participants’ mnemonic competence.  Although 
this does not yet establish any causal links between source and truth at the implicit level of 
default belief, these recall rates are compatible with such possibilities and render the present 
hypotheses plausible by demonstrating participants’ mnemonic capacity to retain both pieces of 
information. 
                                               
2
 The performance of those scoring below chance cannot simply be attributed to inattention: of the 17 
participants scoring below chance on source memory, only four of them were also among the 16 scoring 
below chance on truth memory. 
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Recall for validity.  To look more closely at memory for statement validity, recall 
accuracy was submitted to a 2 (source: BF, LL) x 2 (truth: true, false) x 2 (interruption: yes, no) 
repeated-measures ANOVA (a between-groups ANOVA revealed no statistical difference due to 
the order in which source/truth queries were administered, so data was collapsed across the two 
groups for analysis).  Main effects emerged for all three variables: truth, showing that true 
statements were better recalled than false statements (.63 and .47, respectively), F(1,66) = 46.38, 
p < .001, p
2
 = .36; source, showing that validity was better recalled for statements from a BF 
than an LL (.59 and .52, respectively), F(1,66) = 13.92, p < .001, p
2
 = .17; and interruption, 
showing that uninterrupted statements were better recalled than interrupted statements (.59 and 
.52, respectively), F(1,66) = 13.50, p < .001, p
2
 = .17.   
More importantly, all two-way interactions were significant.  First, as predicted by the 
original Gilbert hypothesis, an interaction between interruption and truth showed that 
interruption caused recall to suffer, but only for false statements, F(1,66) = 8.28, p = .005, p
2
 = 
.11.  According to the original Gilbert hypothesis, this occurs because statements that are 
originally comprehended as false—but not evaluated, due to interruption—are erroneously 
recalled as true by default.  
However, an interaction between source and interruption further revealed that the 
diminution of accuracy triggered by interruption was borne primarily by LL sources.  When the 
source was a best friend, accuracy for statement validity was virtually unaffected by interruption 
(.58 when interrupted, .60 when not), a notable exception to the signature drop in accuracy 
expected among interrupted false statements.  Conversely, when the source was an LL, the 
interrupting tone caused recall to drop from .58 to .45, F(1,66) = 16.22, p < .001, p
2
 = .20 (see 
Figure 9).   
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Figure 9: Interruption decreased accurate recall for truth information, but only for LL sources. 
Finally, a truth x source interaction showed that recall for validity was best when true 
statements were paired with a best friend.  Recall for statements presented as false was the same 
across sources (both .47), but for statements presented as true, a performance gap emerged 
between them, with a visible advantage for BFs (MBF = .71, MLL =  .56), F(1,66) = 21.08, p < 
.001, p
2
 = .24 (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Recall for T statements better than F statements, but only for BF sources. 
Where does this leave us with regard to default belief?  To answer that question requires 
an inspection of reversal data.  The same 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was repeated using reversals of 
statement truth as the unit of analysis (i.e., proportion of true statements recalled as false, and 
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proportion of false statements recalled as true).
3
  This revealed the anticipated main effect of 
truth, indicating that false statements were more likely to be erroneously recalled as true (.28) 
than vice versa (.14), F(1,66) = 38.95, p < .001, p
2
 = .37, and importantly, the anticipated 
interaction between interruption and truth, showing that interruption specifically increased 
reversals from false-to-true, F(1,66) = 7.04, p = .01, p
2
 = .10 (see Figure 11).   
 
Figure 11: The “truth bias,” showing that interruption caused FasT reversals to increase, but not TasF.  
Equally important, however, was a truth x source interaction indicating that although the 
expected Gilbert reversal from false-to-true occurred for both sources, reversals from true-to-
false were less common when the source was a BF (.11, versus .17 for LLs), F(1,66) = 6.23, p = 
.015, p
2
 = .09 (see Figure 12).  As predicted by the coalitional model of an adaptive congruent 
“support bias,” a planned comparison of true-to-false reversals confirmed that these observed 
source differences were significant at the level of implicit, automatic processing exposed by 
interruption (MBF = .082, MLL = .146), t(66) = 2.47, p = .016.  
                                               
3
 Unless otherwise stated, there were no significant between-group differences (due to question order), 
and data was collapsed for all subsequent analyses.   
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Figure 12: Adaptively congruent recall errors: TasF errors low for BFs.  
An examination of reaction time data for these validity judgments revealed a large 
difference between Groups A and B (Ms = 1390ms and 5592ms, respectively), F(1,1,65) = 
187.7, p < .001, p
2
 = .74, but this was merely a result of the different order in which questions 
were asked.  For both groups, whichever question came second (validity or source), a much 
shorter response time was required because there was no need to re-read the statement upon 
which judgment was being made.  Because of this large (though benign) overall difference, 
reaction times for validity judgments were analyzed separately by group.
4
   
Looking first at Group B, for whom truth judgments came before source judgments, a 
main effect of source was observed, showing that the validity of statements coming from best 
friends were evaluated more quickly than statements from least-liked individuals (Ms = 5384ms 
and 5800ms, respectively), F(1,28) = 7.46, p = .01, p
2
 = .21.  However, this main effect was 
qualified by the predicted source x interruption interaction, showing that interruption prompted 
                                               
4
 RT data for both validity judgments and source memory judgments (discussed below) was 
conservatively trimmed.  Ms and SDs were calculated within each group (A and B), and also within each 
type of judgment (source and validity).  RTs greater than 3 SDs above the mean were removed, as well as 
RTs < 200ms (if it was the first query of a test trial) and < 100ms (if it was the second query of a test 
trial).  The same selection criteria were applied to the RT data in Experiments 2 and 3.  In this 
experiment, these selection criteria resulted in the removal of 1.6% of the total RT data (130 of 8,042 RT 
data points).   
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participants to make their source judgments a full second quicker for statements from BFs than 
from LLs (Ms = 5161ms and 6177ms, respectively), F(1,28) = 9.58, p < .01, p
2
 = .26 (see 
Figure 13).
5
  Importantly, interruption also resulted in an increased frequency of truth 
attributions.  That is, interruption not only led participants to be quicker in their source memory 
for BF statements, it also led them to judge more of those statements as being true.  On average, 
an interrupted statement sourced to a BF was almost twice as likely to be rated “true” as an 
uninterrupted statement sourced to a BF (a 95% higher rate).
6
 
 
Figure 13: Interruption led to quicker RTs for BFs (on truth judgments).  
In sharp contrast, an analysis of the validity reaction time data for Group A, for whom 
validity judgments came after source judgments, revealed no main effects or interactions.   
Recall for source.  Turning to source memory performance, did recall differ between the 
two sources?  Yes, but indirectly.  Overall source accuracy was in fact identical for BFs and LLs 
(.69 for both).  But a 2 (source: BF, LL) x 2 (truth: true, false) x 2 (interruption: yes, no) within-
subjects ANOVA, taking source memory performance as the dependent measure, revealed 
                                               
5
 All other comparisons, n.s. 
6
 An interrupted statement sourced to an LL was 59.9% more likely to be rated “true” compared to an 
uninterrupted statement sourced to an LL, so interruption increased the likelihood of truth attributions in 
general.  But it increased the likelihood at a much higher rate among BFs than LLs (59% higher). 
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several suggestive interactions.  First, an interaction between truth and interruption showed that 
although source memory was the same for true and false statements that were not interrupted 
(.70), interruption led to a decline in source memory for false statements (.65), F(1,66) = 4.11, p 
= .047, p
2
 = .06 (see Figure 14).   
 
 
Figure 14: Interruption produced a decrease in source memory accuracy, but only for statements presented as false.  
This change, however, is explained by a source x interruption interaction (described below), showing that 
interruption affected the two sources differently—improving source accuracy for BFs but decreasing source 
accuracy for LLs. 
 
The nature of this change becomes somewhat clearer when we consider an additional 
interaction observed between source and interruption.  This shows that the decline produced by 
interruption was specific to LL sources (from .72 down to .66), whereas a small degree of 
improvement was observed for BF sources (from .68 up to .70), F(1,66) = 3.72, p = .058, p
2
 = 
.04.  As can be seen in Figure 15, although source memory was in fact better for LLs when 
interruption was absent, this relationship inverted when interruption was present.   
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Figure 15: Interruption caused source accuracy to decrease for LLs, but not BFs. 
 
Finally, a trending source x truth interaction indicated that although source memory for 
LLs was the same whether statements had been tagged as true or not (.69), source memory for 
BFs was slightly better for true statements (.72), and slightly worse for false statements (.66), 
F(1,66) = 2.92, p = .09, p
2
 = .04 (see Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16: Rates of source memory recall for LLs were the same whether the statement had been true or false, but 
source memory for BFs was significantly better for true statements than false statements.   
  
Strictly speaking, none of these source analyses bear directly on the matter of default 
belief, but they do suggest a complex dynamic between the two sources.  The fact that 
interruption produced the interactions reviewed here should call our attention to the possibility 
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that some portion of these source dynamics are operating at the same implicit level of cognition 
as Gilbert’s truth bias.  
What about the predicted difference in source memory for individuals in Group A (where 
source memory was queried prior to validity), as a function of interruption?  The prediction was 
that interruption would have its typical effect of facilitating a truth bias for those statements, and 
in Group A, the condition where source memory was queried prior to validity, a support bias 
would lead participants to displace their sense of truth onto their judgment of source, leading to 
an increased rate of BFs being recalled as the source.      
In line with this prediction, participants in Group A showed no tendency to recall one 
source more than the other on uninterrupted trials (source recall rates for uninterrupted trials 
were MBF = .498, MLL = .503), but a tendency was observed to recall BFs more frequently than 
LLs on trials where interruption had been present (source recall rates for interrupted trials: MBF = 
.531, MLL = .469).  Although this difference was not statistically significant, t(37) = 1.43, p = .16, 
it was in the predicted direction.  If interruption leads to a default presumption of truth, it would 
be adaptively congruent for that presumption to cast a shadow upon source judgments—in this 
case nudging source memory away from a balanced proportion of choices toward a rate favoring 
best friends over enemies.    
Notably, this trend was also connected to a change in truth judgments.  Among those 
statements that had been interrupted, subjects who first selected their BF as the recalled source 
also recalled those statements being true at a higher rate than when LL was selected as the 
source (recall rates were MBF = .522, SE = .03; MLL = .425, SE = .03), t(37) = 2.51, p = .017.  But 
this only held true for interrupted statements.  When statements had not been interrupted, 
subjects who first selected their BF as the recalled source were not more likely to judge 
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statements as true than when LLs were selected (recall rates were MBF = .429, SE = .03; MLL = 
.394, SE = .03), t < 1.  Of course, since truth judgments were made after source judgments, it is 
possible that controlled processing partially accounts for this finding.  But it would not help 
explain why interruption made a selective difference for the two sources, since any deliberate, 
controlled processing would presumably affect validity judgments regardless of whether the 
statements had been interrupted.  Seeing that interruption leaves this mark in the data is 
suggestive of automatic epistemic processes that facilitate judgment in directions that are 
adaptively congruent with coalitional support.
7
    
Turning to reaction time data for source memory, as with the RT data for validity 
judgments a large difference between Groups A and B was observed (Ms = 4858ms and 1082ms 
respectively), F(1,1,65) = 345.2, p < .001, p
2
 = .84, but as already indicated this was merely a 
result of the different order in which questions were asked.  Each group took more time to 
answer the first question they faced (whether validity or source judgment).  Once again, RTs for 
source judgments were analyzed separately by group.   
Reaction times for Group A, for whom source judgments came before validity judgments 
(and for whom no RT differences of any kind were observed with regard to validity RTs), 
showed a main effect of truth, indicating that source memory decisions were rendered more 
quickly for true statements than for false statements (MT = 4732ms, SE = 185; MF = 4984ms, SE 
= 170), F(1,37) = 4.61, p = .038, p
2
 = .11.  Two important interactions qualify this finding, 
                                               
7
 Although no predictions were made for Group B, where validity judgments were made first and then 
source judgments, we see a somewhat similar picture.  Looking at the conditional probability of choosing 
either source depending on whether the validity judgment was true or false, we found a difference 
between source recall (even for uninterrupted trials), with a strong tendency to choose a BF over an LL if 
the initial truth judgment had been true, (recall rates for BFs and LLs on uninterrupted statements first 
judged as true were MBF = .429, SE = .03; MLL = .271, SE = .02), t(37) = 3.26, p = .002.  However, this 
difference was magnified when statements had been interrupted; that is, the tendency to choose a BF over 
an LL when the initial validity judgment was true grew larger (recall rates for interrupted statements first 
judged as true were MBF = .522, SE = .03; MLL = .253, SE = .03), t(37) = 4.80, p < .001.  
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however.  First, an interaction between truth and interruption showed that source memory 
decisions for true and false statements were made at identical rates when interruption was absent 
(Ms = 4817 and 4815, respectively), but interruption elicited faster RTs for true statements and 
longer RTs for false statements (Ms = 4647 and 5154, respectively), F(1,37) = 7.35, p = .01, p
2
 
= .17 (see Figure 17).   
 
Figure 17: Interruption caused source memory RTs to decrease for true statements, and increase for false 
statements.    
 
Second, and critically, a source x truth interaction revealed that it was BF reaction times 
that were affected by interaction.  While reaction times for LL judgments were approximately 
equal across epistemic states (MT = 4906, MF = 4950), BF source judgments were faster when 
true (MT = 4558) and slower when false (MF = 5019), F(1,37) = 4.07, p = .051, p
2
 = .10 (see 
Figure 18). 
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Figure 18: The effect of interruption on RTs was borne entirely by BF sources (adaptively congruent): RTs for best 
friends became faster for true statements, but slower for false statements.    
 
In stark contrast, an analysis of the Group B RTs for source memory, where source 
judgments came after validity judgments, revealed no significant statistical effects or interactions 
(all ps > .14).   
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 encourage the continued use of the present protocol.  
Accuracy for both source and truth information was above chance, indicating that the Gilbert 
protocol was robust to the insertion of additional variables and test measures, without inflicting 
detrimental costs on memory performance.  With regard to measuring both truth and source at 
test, the order in which those questions are posed did not seem to have a significant impact on 
memory performance, although reaction times were considerably affected.  RTs for the second 
half of each test trial were significantly faster than RTs for the first half, but more interestingly, 
the source-truth-interruption relationships observed among the RTs for the first half of each test 
trial (whether source or truth) were wholly absent among the RTs for the second question 
(whether source or truth).   
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Recall and reaction time data for statement truth provided provisional supporting 
evidence for the coalitional hypotheses advanced here.  Although the signature components of 
the Gilbert effect were preserved (interruption fostered an overall increase in false-to-true 
reversals), they were modulated by source information.  The best recall accuracy was found 
among statements that had paired a best friend with truth, and the impact of interruption was to 
produce fewer true-to-false reversals for best friends than for least-liked acquaintances.  
Additionally, the reaction times for these judgments proved adaptively congruent: interruption 
led to faster RTs for statements originally paired with a best friend, and increased truth 
attributions for those statements.   
Source memory data also revealed adaptively congruent results.  The best source memory 
performance was found for statements pairing a best friend with truth, while the worst 
performance was found among statements pairing a best friend with falsity.  Moreover, the 
impact of interruption on reaction times was markedly selective: times became faster for 
statements that had paired a best friend with truth.  And analyses of conditional probability 
indicated that, among Group A participants who judged source memory prior to statement 
validity, interruption prompted participants to select BFs as the source slightly more often than 
LLs, and prompted them to recall truth for those BFs at a higher rate than when interruption was 
absent—a set of findings consistent with the hypothesis of coalitional support operating at the 
level of implicit epistemic bias.    
Experiment 2: Source Valence 
An important difference between friends and enemies is their contrasting valence: friends 
are reliably associated with positive affect, whereas enemies are reliably associated with negative 
affect.  But these associations present a potential confound for the coalitional interpretations 
Epistemic vigilance 
 55 
explored here.  Any discrepancy that arises in the pattern of default belief might be due not to the 
influence of coalitional dynamics, but to the clear affective differences that distinguish the 
sources.  This possibility can be tested.  Although the attribute of valence is intrinsic to matters 
of coalitional affiliation, the reverse is not true: valence applies to a vast set of psychological 
phenomena having nothing to do with coalition.  Therefore, by changing the type of sources 
chosen by participants—namely, to sources with positive or negative valence but without 
coalitional affiliation—we may assess the influence of valence on default belief, independent of 
coalitional considerations.  If the results observed with non-coalitional sources overlap with 
those produced with best friends and enemies, then the postulated import of coalitional cognition 
on default belief needs to be scrutinized closely.  Alternatively, if the results obtained differ from 
those obtained with coalitional sources, then we are justified in our continued exploration of 
coalitional constructs, which would include, but not be reducible to, differences of valence.  The 
predictions ventured here are straightforward: truth judgments (rendered in the context of the 
present protocol) will not differ between the two non-coalitional sources, despite their manifest 
differences in valence.  To implement this manipulation, participants were asked to type in the 
names of their most-liked and least-liked high school teachers.
 8
   
Method 
Participants.  Thirty-three undergraduates from Washington University (12 female, 21 
male) with a mean age 19.9 years, participated for course credit.  All participants were native 
English speakers.  No between-groups design was used to vary the order in which participants 
                                               
8
 High school teachers were chosen instead of college professors because (1) some of our participants 
(e.g. freshmen) had limited experience to draw from, truncating their options (i.e. seniors have been 
exposed to more instructors), (2) pilot studies using preferred and disliked professors as sources revealed 
that even among older students, subjects’ choices were not sufficiently valenced (some students had no 
professors they especially disliked), making the designation of “least-liked” a forced and non-
representative label, and (3) pilot studies indicated that participants were easily able to identify high 
school teachers about whom they retained strong affective sentiments. 
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answered source and validity questions at test.  For each statement, all participants were asked to 
recall the source first, and then validity. 
Materials, design, and procedure.  All aspects of the experiment were identical to Pilot 
Experiment 2 except for the following.  First, participants were asked to enter the names of the 
high school teacher they had most liked (positive valence without coalitional affiliation), and the 
one they had least-liked (negative valence without coalitional affiliation).   
The test phase was identical to Experiment 1 in its random presentation of 56 trivia 
statements (48 old, 8 new), and participants were once again be asked to (1) recall the source of 
each statement, and (2) recall whether each statement had been true, false, followed by no 
information, or was new. 
Results 
Recall for validity.  Data from one participant was removed prior to analysis due to 
inattention.  Does the valence of the source, independent of coalitional affiliation, influence 
default belief?  Addressing recall for statement validity first, the proportion of statements 
accurately recalled as true or false was submitted to a 2 (truth) x 2 (interruption) x 2 (source) 
repeated-measures ANOVA.  A main effect emerged for interruption, showing that the truth of 
uninterrupted statements was remembered better (M = .53, SE = .03) than interrupted statements 
(M = .47, SE = .03), F(1,31) = 6.68, p = .015, p
2
 = .18.  But this was qualified by two 
interactions.  First, the expected interaction between truth and interruption was found, indicating 
that interruption had reduced accuracy for false statements but not true statements (presumably 
because the false statements were being erroneously recalled as true), F(1,31) = 4.85, p = .035, 
p
2
 = .14.   
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However, an additional interaction between source and interruption colors this 
interpretation by revealing that the impact of interruption was borne entirely by LL teachers 
rather than ML teachers, F(1,31) = 5.08, p = .031, p
2
 = .14.  For most-liked teachers, recall was 
not affected at all by interruption (.50 in both conditions), but interruption produced a decrease in 
accuracy for least-liked teachers (.44 when interrupted, versus .55 when not) (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Interruption decreased accurate recall for truth information, but only for LL teachers. 
An ANOVA was then performed upon rates of truth-reversal, resulting in a main effect of 
truth (as expected, reversals from false-to-true were more common than reversals from true-to-
false: Ms = .22 and .14 respectively; SEs = .03 and .02 respectively), F(1,31) = 6.30, p = .018, 
p
2
 = .17.  But no other significant findings emerged (all ps > .13), including no truth x 
interruption interaction, anticipated to show that false-to-true reversals were more common 
following interruption.   
When reaction times for validity judgments were examined, a single significant 
interaction was observed between source and interruption, showing that RTs for truth judgments 
were somewhat slower for ML teachers when statements were not interrupted, but reversed (truth 
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judgments somewhat faster for ML teachers) when statements were interrupted, F(1,31) = 7.11, 
p = .012, p
2
 = .19 (all other Fs < 1) (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20: Interruption made validity RTs faster for ML teachers, and slower for LL teachers.  
Recall for source.  Turning to source memory performance, overall accuracy rates were 
comparable whether the target was the most-liked high school teacher (M = .73, SE = .02) or the 
least-liked teacher (M = .72, SE = .03).  A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no main effects, 
but one interaction between truth and source, F(1,31) = 5.89, p = .021, p
2
 = .16 (all other ps > 
.20).  This finding indicated that recall of one’s most-liked teacher was better for statements that 
had been true (.78 versus .68 for false statements), whereas the successful recall of one’s least-
liked teacher did not depend on whether the statement had been true or false (.70 in both cases) 
(see Figure 21).   
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Figure 21: For LL teachers, successful recall of source was the same for both true and false statements, but for ML 
teachers, recall was significantly better for true statements.   
 
A closer examination of the source memory data revealed no systematic tendency to 
recall one source over the other, even under conditions of interruption.  For the 32 uninterrupted 
statements which had been presented during the study phase, participants recalled their most-
liked teacher as the source 52% of the time, a proportion which did not differ from chance: t(31) 
= 1.25, p > .20, and for the 16 interrupted statements, participants were still no more likely to 
recall their ML teacher as the source (51%), t(31) < 1, p > .60.  Nonetheless, for the purpose of 
comparing these results to those of Experiment 1, an examination of conditional probabilities 
was made, but revealed no significant differences between sources: whether subjects first 
decided that the source was their ML or LL teacher had no impact on whether they subsequently 
decided the statement’s validity was true or false, and this held regardless of interruption (ts < 1).   
An inspection of RTs for source memory revealed that the overall decision times required 
to recall the two types of sources did not significantly differ from each other: (Ms = 4892ms and 
5188ms, for ML and LL respectively), F(1,31) = 2.01, p > .15.  However, two interactions were 
observed, one between source and truth (participants were quickest to assess the source of 
statements that paired their favorite teacher with truth, and slowest on statements that paired their 
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least-favorite teacher with truth), F(1,31) = 9.45, p = .004, p
2
 = .23, and also between source 
and interruption (in the presence of interruption, RTs became quicker for statements paired with 
ML teachers, whereas in the absence of interruption, RTs for ML and LL teachers were 
approximately the same), F(1,31) = 21.16, p < .001, p
2
 = .41 (see Figures 22 and 23).  
 
Figure 22: For statements that had been presented as true, recall of source information was significantly faster for 
ML teachers than for LL teachers.    
 
 
Figure 23: Interruption led source memory RTs to decrease for ML teachers and increase for LL teachers.   
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Discussion 
The results of this experiment will require a more nuanced treatment in the general 
discussion, but we can say here that (1) although valence does seem to influence recall of source 
and truth information, (2) in ways similar to coalitional sources in Experiment 1, (3) these 
differences were less visible at the level of default belief: among the truth-reversal data (recalling 
true statements as false, or false statements as true), there were no observed interactions between 
source and truth, nor between source and interruption.   
In terms of recall for truth information, interruption decreased overall accuracy for false 
statements (as expected), but it also selectively affected LL teachers rather than ML teachers (in 
much the same way that enemies were affected in Experiment 1), which was not anticipated.  In 
terms of the reversal data, there were no interactions, but the pattern of the data still bears much 
resemblance to the reversal data obtained in Experiment 1, and some of the nonsignificant 
interactions (e.g., source x interruption, p = .13) may have reached levels of significance if the 
statistical power of this study had matched that of Experiment 1 (where sample size was double 
that of Experiment 2).   
In terms of RTs for validity statements, no findings were anticipated here.  Indeed, in 
Group A of Experiment 1 (which comparably assessed source memory first and then truth) no 
significant findings related to validity RTs were found.  But here a significant interaction was 
observed between source and interruption (similar to Group B of Experiment 1), showing that 
interruption prompted faster RTs for statements associated with ML teachers, and slower RTs for 
statements associated with LL teachers. 
Where source memory is concerned, there were additional parallels with Experiment 1.  
Successful recall of LL teachers occurred at a similar rate for both true and false statements, but 
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not for ML teachers: when the source was an ML teacher, source was recalled significantly better 
if the statement had also been true.  Reaction time data for source memory also revealed source 
differences: source was recalled significantly faster if a statement had paired an ML teacher with 
truth, but significantly slower if it had paired an LL teacher with truth.  Finally, as for best 
friends in Experiment 1, interruption led to selectively quicker RTs for ML teachers.  
In short, when our future understanding of coalitional cognition finally allows us to 
delineate the parameters that fully demarcate it as a cognitive construct, we can be reasonably 
confident that valence will play a significant role in its constitution (or covary strongly with an 
equally important third variable).   
However, it would be unreasonable to dismiss the relevance of coalition, because several 
key source distinctions emerged between the two studies.  Unlike Experiment 1, where true 
information was better recalled when paired with a BF versus an LL, and true statements were 
more likely to be reversed (T-as-F) for LLs than BFs, no such relations were found among ML 
and LL teachers.  And though as already noted it is quite possible that some marginal trends 
would reach significance with increased statistical power, it is also true that some of the observed 
interactions between ML and LL sources here moved in different directions than the interactions 
between best friends and enemies.  For instance, in Experiment 1 the reaction times for source 
memory showed that the fastest judgments were for statements that joined BFs with truth, and 
the slowest judgments were for statements that joined BFs with falsity—an adaptively congruent 
effect, consistent with the idea of default epistemic support of coalitional ties.  However, in 
Experiment 2, RTs for the source memory of false statements did not differ between ML and LL 
teachers.  Additionally, interruption did not prompt greater recall of MLs as the source, nor a 
greater likelihood of veracity judgments in favor of truth when sourced to an ML (as occurred 
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with Group A in Experiment 1, for whom statistical power was comparable).  Finally, in 
Experiment 1 the effect of interruption on source memory RTs was to increase speed for 
statements that paired BFs with truth (adaptive congruency), whereas the effect of interruption 
on ML teachers in Experiment 2 was not specific to either true or false statements.     
Experiment 3: Precaution 
The rationale for using remote trivia statements has been, as with the original Gilbert 
studies, to ensure that participants’ background knowledge would not influence their assessment 
of statement truth; in this way, the computer-provided truth tag should be the participants’ only 
subjective basis for recalling truth.  However, this approach may reduce ecological validity to the 
extent that it ruptures the natural link between a speech act and its intentional purpose(s) (e.g. 
Grice, 1957; Sperber & Wilson, 1996).  Outside of artificial environments (e.g. formal 
schooling), communicative acts are more likely to be immediately relevant (e.g., social news, 
gossip, precautionary warnings, health advice) and less in the service of transmitting 
comparatively esoteric semantic information (e.g. trivia).  As such, a more compelling protocol 
would seek to include statements that are epistemically ambiguous but also potentially relevant.  
Such is the aim of this final experiment.  
Although studies in areas other than epistemic belief have indicated the likelihood of 
domain-specific cognition devoted to precautionary concerns (e.g., contagion, contamination, 
physical danger; see, e.g., Boyer & Lienard, 2006), there are no theoretical reasons advanced 
here as to why the domain of precaution would interact with coalitional sources at the level of 
default belief.  As such, the hypotheses ventured here are the same as those for Experiment 1: a 
coalitional “support bias” that manifests itself in (1) the reversal data (when the source is an LL, 
the data will remain no different than when no source is present, but when the source is a best 
Epistemic vigilance 
 64 
friend, interruption will increase the perception of truth, resulting in an increase of false 
statements recalled as true, and a decrease of true statements recalled as false), (2) in source 
memory (a bias, for interrupted statements, towards recalling one’s best friend as the source 
when source is queried before validity), and (3) in reaction times (for source and truth 
judgments, where RTs are quickest when a statement pairs a best friend with truth, and amplified 
by interruption).    
Method 
Participants.  Thirty-five Washington University undergraduates (24 female, 11 male), 
with a mean age 19.21 years, participated for course credit or $5.00.   
Materials, design, and procedure. All aspects of the experiment were identical to 
Experiment 1, with the key exception of a change to the statement stimuli.  In place of arcane 
trivia, the set of statements were changed to ambiguous precautionary statements: admonitory 
pronouncements of uncertain validity (see Appendix B for full stimulus set).  Examples include: 
“Bruised fruit is more likely to be contaminated by bacterial pathogens.” 
“Drinking water from a plastic bottle that was left in a heated car may contain toxins.” 
“There are more germs on a bathroom door handle than on the bathroom floor.” 
Pilot data were gathered for these statements on their general plausibility (using a Likert 
scale of 1-7).  Only fully ambiguous statements (with average validity ratings between 3.2 and 
4.8) were selected for inclusion, to prevent the interference of background knowledge and to 
preserve the function of the computer-provided truth tag.  These precaution statements were 
randomly assigned to one source of the other, with the constraint that the aggregated plausibility 
means for statements attributed to each source equal a fully neutral 4.0.  No other aspects of the 
protocol were changed.  
 
Epistemic vigilance 
 65 
Results 
Data from three participants were removed prior to analysis due to implementation of the 
wrong SuperLab script (in one case) and inattention (two cases).  The accuracy of an additional 
three participants was nearly two SDs below the mean (and within chance levels), but statistical 
analyses were not qualitatively changed by their omission from the data, so the reports that 
follow include them.   
Recall for validity.  Did the domain of information make a difference?  Was 
precautionary information treated differently than more mundane types of information?  Overall 
accuracy for the recall of statement validity was .59 (SE = .03), comparable to the previous two 
experiments.  The proportion of precautionary statements accurately recalled as true and false 
was once again submitted to a 2 (truth) x 2 (interruption) x 2 (source) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. Main effects were observed for source, where better accuracy was observed for 
statements associated with a best friend (MBF = .62, SE = .04; MLL = .56, SE = .03), F(1,31) = 
4.28, p = .047, p
2
 = .12, as well as for interruption, indicating that truth was better recalled on 
uninterrupted trials (M = .64 versus .55 for interrupted trials), F(1,31) = 8.79, p = .006, p
2
 = .22.  
However, these main effects were qualified by a single two-way interaction between source and 
interruption, showing that the modulating effect of interruption was restricted to least-liked 
sources (accuracy .49, versus .64 when uninterrupted), and did not affect accuracy when the 
source was a best friend (accuracy .61, versus .63 when uninterrupted), F(1,31) = 5.14, p = .031, 
p
2
 = .14 (see Figure 24).  However, unlike previous studies, the effect of interruption on LL 
accuracy was not restricted to false statements; accuracy for both true and false statements 
plummeted (hence the absence of a source x truth x interruption interaction). 
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Figure 24: Interruption decreased accurate recall for truth information, but only for LL sources. 
This ANOVA was then repeated using reversals as the dependent measure, but no 
significant findings were observed.  Likewise, an analysis of RTs for truth judgments also 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions, aside from a marginal main effect of truth 
(statements presented as true were recalled more quickly: MT = 1491ms, MF = 1648ms), F(1,31) 
= 4.11, p = .051, p
2
 = .12.  
Recall for source.  Turning to source memory (which was queried before memory for 
truth), best friends were recalled better on average (M = .79, SE = .02) than least-liked 
individuals (M = .72, SE = .02), F(1,31) = 5.39, p = .027, p
2
 = .15.  However, a strong 
interaction between truth and source revealed that BFs were better remembered for true 
statements (MT = .82, versus MF = .76), while LLs were better remembered for false statements 
(MF = .79, versus MT = .66), F(1,31) = 16.91, p < .001, p
2
 = .35 (see Figure 25).  Additionally, a 
marginal 3-way interaction was observed between source, truth, and interruption, indicating that 
interruption affected the two sources differently: it improved BF source accuracy among false 
statements (but not true), while improving LL source accuracy among true statements (but not 
false), F(1,31) = 2.94, p = .097, p
2
 = .09 (see Figures 26a and 26b).   
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Figure 25: Recall of validity for false statements was the same for both BF and LL sources, but successful recall of 
true statements was much better for BF sources than LL sources.   
 
 
Figures 26a and 26b: A 3-way source x truth x interruption interaction of source memory: Interruption caused 
source accuracy for BFs to increase for false statements (but not true), while interruption caused LL source accuracy 
to increase for true statements (but not false).   
 
As with Experiment 1, there was no reliable tendency for participants to recall one source 
more than the other on uninterrupted trials (source recall rates for uninterrupted trials were MBF 
= .531, MLL = .469), t(31) = 1.70, p = .10, but a reliable tendency to do so on interrupted trials 
(source recall rates for interrupted trials: MBF = .535, MLL = .465), t(31) = 2.12, p < .05.  
Although this difference was small, it was statistically significant and in the predicted direction.  
Moreover, this trend was connected to a change in truth judgments.  For interrupted statements, 
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subjects who first selected their BF as the recalled source also recalled those statements being 
true at a higher rate than when their LL was the selected source (recall rates for truth were MBF = 
.430, SE = .03; MLL = .309, SE = .03), t(31) = 2.69, p < .01.  For uninterrupted trials, however, 
this pattern was no longer statistically reliable (recall rates were MBF = .467, SE = .04; MLL = 
.378, SE = .04), t(31) = 1.93, p = .062.  This pattern of findings, which was also found in 
Experiment 1 (among BFs and LLs), but not in Experiment 2 (among ML teachers and LL 
teachers) adds some measure of plausibility to the notion of a support bias operating specifically 
among coalitional allies (best friends).   
An examination of reaction times for source judgments revealed only a main effect of 
interruption, showing that source memory decisions were quicker for statements that had not 
been interrupted (M = 4081ms, compared to M = 4348ms for interrupted statements), F(1,31) = 
8.46, p = .007, p
2
 = .21.  
The results from the present experiment deviate substantially from the foregoing two.  In 
order to clarify the results, an additional point of comparison was sought. 
Experiment 4: Precaution 2 
In an effort to get a clearer picture of the relationship between source and recall for the 
truth of precautionary information, a second group of participants were run using the same 
protocol as those in 3-A but omitting the source memory assessment at test.
9
  This was an 
attempt to implement the original Gilbert study using precautionary statements with as little 
modification as possible (i.e. without any noise potentially associated with providing source 
memory judgments, especially since both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3A had participants 
making source judgments prior to making validity judgments).   
                                               
9
 Forty-eight participants were recruited from the WU human subjects pool (28 female, 20 male; mean 
age 19.28).  Data for three participants was removed prior to analysis due to evidence of inattention 
and/or failure to follow directions. 
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Recall for validity.  Under these slightly modified conditions, overall accuracy for the 
recall of statement validity was .58 (SE = .02).  Upon examination of recall for truth information, 
main effects were observed for truth, indicating that true statements were better recalled than 
false statements (MT = .62, SE = .03; MF = .54, SE = .03), F(1,44) = 7.65, p = .008, p
2
 = .15, and 
for interruption, indicating that uninterrupted statements were better recalled (M = .62, SE = .02) 
than interrupted ones (M = .53, SE = .03), F(1,44) = 8.40, p = .006, p
2
 = .16.  However, these 
were qualified by a marginal source x interruption interaction, showing interruption to produce a 
decrement in recall, but selectively for statements from an LL source, F(1,44) = 3.01, p = .09, p
2
 
= .06 (see Figure 27).   
 
Figure 27: Interruption significantly reduced recall of statement validity for LL sources but not BF sources.   
 
A three-way (source x truth x interruption) interaction was also observed, showing that 
interruption made a selective impact on the accurate recall of false statements associated with LL 
sources, F(1,44) = 7.60, p = .008, p
2
 = .15 (see Figures 28a and 28b). 
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Figures 28a and 28b: A 3-way interaction within memory for statement validity: interruption selectively reduced 
the accurate recall of false statements associated with LL sources. 
 
Turning to reversals as the dependent measure, a single main effect was observed for 
truth, indicating that false statements were more likely to be reversed to “true” than vice versa 
(Ms = .20 [SE = .02] and .14 [SE = .02], respectively), F(1,44) = 5.02, p = .03, p
2
 = .10.  No 
other analyses were statistically significant.    
Finally, analysis of reaction times for truth judgments revealed only a main effect of 
truth, such that decision times for true statements were slightly shorter (M = 3297ms, SE = 127) 
than those for false statements (M = 3542ms, SE = 142), F(1,44) = 7.28, p = .01, p
2
 = .14.   
Discussion 
When precautionary statements are the communicated information, the source of that 
information continues to matter, but not in the same way as previous studies.  In these precaution 
studies, (1) information labeled as true was better remembered by best friends than least-liked 
individuals, (2) interruption exerted a detrimental influence on recall for information from LLs, 
but not BFs, and (3) source memory was best when statements paired truth with BFs.   
But in the domain of reversal data, where the truth bias typically makes its signature 
mark, we see an absence of significant results (in Experiment 3) and no source differences of any 
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kind (in both Experiments  3 and 4).  Reaction time data in both studies also failed to reveal any 
distinctions between the two sources, neither for source nor validity judgments.    
These are unexpected results, but it would be premature to discount the importance of 
further study in this area.  It is possible that a more detailed set of theoretical predictions needs to 
be specified with regard to precautionary statements, given that, in areas of study other than 
epistemic belief, research has indicated the presence of domain-specific cognition devoted to 
precautionary concerns (e.g., contagion, contamination, physical danger) (see, e.g., Boyer & 
Lienard, 2006).   
But another important possibility is a subtle difference among the precautionary 
statements that was absent among the trivia statements; namely, that the precaution statements 
provided useful information when false.  Hasson and colleagues (Hasson et al., 2005) were able 
to replicate the Gilbert truth bias for statements that did not permit informative inferences when 
false, but were not able to replicate the truth bias when false statements did permit informative 
inferences.  To use one of their examples, learning that George owns a television is false implies 
several possible things about George.  It could mean that he is an avid reader with no interest in 
television, or it could mean that he streams everything he watches to a computer, or that he is so 
financially impoverished he can’t afford a television (or an apartment in which to put it).  Of 
course, none of these possibilities need be true.  But the point is that the statement’s falsity is not 
wholly uninformative: George is (for one reason or another) atypical relative to the average 
television-loving American.  Contrast this with the type of statements used by Gilbert in the Hopi 
language experiment.  In this case, which nominally taught Hopi language vocabulary to 
participants, learning A tica is a fox is actually false does not tell us what a “tica” is (if anything), 
nor what the correct Hopi word for “fox” might be: there are no meaningful inferences to derive 
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from its negation.  And this inferential state was true of many of the trivia statements used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 above.  Negating the truth of “The first postage stamp was introduced by 
Great Britain in 1840, and featured a portrait of Queen Victoria” does not afford any meaningful 
inferences.  Indeed, we can’t even say precisely where the error might be (perhaps it was 1840, 
but not Great Britain; or Great Britain, but not 1840; or perhaps it wasn’t Queen Victoria).  In 
contrast, many of the precaution statements used in Experiment 3 do afford meaningful 
inferences, whether tagged as true or false.  For instance, a statement like “drinking water from a 
plastic bottle left in a heated car may contain toxins” is no less informative if it is false than if it 
is true.  Either way, the information is relevant to health and behavior.  Perhaps more 
importantly, as pointed out by Hasson, an affirmative rendition of the proposition can be 
generated and stored in memory (e.g., “plastic water bottles left in heated cars do not contain 
toxins”).   
 If the inferential potential of the precautionary statements used here afford different 
propositional representations, with direct epistemic consequences, then the stimulus set may 
need revision before a clear understanding of the source relationships can be articulated. 
General Discussion 
 
 The inclusion of source information, provided by participants who name real 
acquaintances, is a somewhat unorthodox venture in the domain of judgment and decision 
making.  And if there is a single conclusion to be clearly derived from the foregoing studies, it is 
that matters of coalition and source processing require much more careful investigation before 
any definitive statements can be made.   
 Still, the present studies take an important initial step and illuminate new pathways for 
additional inquiries.  Though the picture of exactly how source information matters is still 
unclear, it is more solidly certain that source information matters (where judgment and belief are 
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concerned).  The act of contemplating a best friend or an enemy as a source of new information 
has consequences for our epistemic processing.  And provocatively, the consequences appear to 
register at the level of automatic appraisal.  The remarkable truth bias discovered by Gilbert and 
colleagues (and replicated by others since) is disrupted when meaningful sources are introduced 
into the protocol.  Most interestingly, information coming from a best friend appears nearly 
impervious to the processing changes normally wrought by interruption, and without altering the 
accuracy of memory pertaining thereto.  It seems that sources with a clear and unequivocally 
positive coalitional affiliation—best friends—trigger a set of privileged but poorly charted 
cognitive changes.     
 That said, several important methodological matters deserve attention.   
First, the insertion of an interrupting tone was designed to truncate attentional resources 
(by requiring a button press in response to the tone).  But in the pilot studies discussed at the 
beginning of this paper, it was observed that some participants seemed able to acknowledge the 
tone and retain their attention for the presented truth information before it disappeared from the 
screen, rendering the tone an imperfect disruption.  In response to this perceived limitation, all 
four dissertation experiments reduced the amount of time that the presented truth tags remained 
on-screen (from 2000ms to 500ms).  While it is unlikely that this change altered or compromised 
the goals of the studies (given that the data reported in Experiment 1 did not strongly diverge 
from the data reported in Pilot Experiment 2, which had a nearly identical protocol), it is also 
unclear whether the shortened presentation time of truth served as an actual solution to the threat 
of participants’ sustained attention.  Perhaps a cleaner procedural change for future studies would 
be to implement a modification adopted by Gilbert himself (Gilbert et al., 1990): using two 
distinct tones instead of one (one high, one low) and requiring participants to press one key in 
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response to the low tone, and another key in response to the high tone.  This would increase the 
attentional demands placed on participants and thereby reduce their ability to consciously 
process statement information, without modifying the presentation of truth information itself.   
Another potentially useful modification would be to establish limitations on how long 
participants have to respond when making source and truth judgments.  The present studies did 
not restrict response times, and some participants accordingly took 20-30 seconds (or more) to 
respond on some trials.  While RT data was trimmed to eliminate times exceeding three standard 
deviations above the mean, it is unknown whether the processing involved in longer response 
times influenced source or validity judgments.  It is at least probable that these exaggerated RTs 
added needless noise to the RT data.  Time limits on participant responses may make the 
footprint of automatic processing more visible, and thereby go some distance towards sharpening 
our picture of default judgment. 
Perhaps the most critical methodological consideration, however, lies in the need to 
reduce variability among the coalitional proxies identified by participants, specifically the 
individuals designated as least-liked acquaintances.  While these self-designated individuals 
were a reasonable approximation for antagonistic coalitional relations, some of these proxies 
proved more ideal than others.  Exit surveys regarding source choices, for instance, revealed that 
some participants identified LL persons with whom they had been aggressive and competitive in 
the past (for reputation, romantic partners, scholastic awards, team sports, etc.).  But other 
participants identified LL persons for whom they had negative but not clearly coalitional 
associations (a roommate with an annoying personality, a former romantic partner who had left 
deep emotional scars, etc.).  With these latter sources, it is likely that their negative valence took 
precedence over any coalitional status, and this would have made the influence of LL sources on 
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implicit cognition more difficult to detect.  Also, in a small number of cases, participants 
indicated that their LL person wasn’t terribly disliked—not hated or bitterly resented—but was 
the only option that came to mind.  With these participants, it is possible that neither coalition 
nor valence exerted any influence on their judgments or response times.   
Source considerations may have influenced the results of Experiment 2.  Although the 
involvement of most-liked and least-liked high school teachers was meant to assess the variable 
of valence while excluding the variable of coalition, it is possible that this manipulation was 
insufficient.  In some cases, least-liked teachers may actually have had coalitional qualities.  Exit 
surveys among Experiment 2 participants indicated that, for some individuals, there were very 
personal reasons for disliking them (being accused of cheating, being labeled a misogynist, not 
being recommended for an academic placement, etc.); to the extent that these situations involved 
coalitional struggles affecting social status, access to professional opportunities, and so on, recall 
of these teachers may have been laced with a coalitional residue.  Most-liked teachers may also 
have exhibited some measure of coalitional relevance, and for the same reasons.  Given the 
temporal proximity of these sources for some of our participants (most college freshmen having 
recently finished high school), these considerations may have weighed more heavily on the 
minds of some than others. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the different epistemic profiles of BF and LL sources (as 
well as ML and LL teachers) were relevant in ways that were not controlled for.  In a number of 
cases, exit surveys revealed that the sources chosen as BFs were very unlikely to have known the 
trivia information presented, and others indicated that the sources chosen as LLs were very likely 
to have known the information presented.  One participant who had just been debriefed turned as 
he was leaving and said, “You know, I really hate the guy [his LL], but he was so damn bright…  
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It seemed like there was never anything he didn’t know.  I bet he would’ve known all of this 
trivia stuff.”  Although differences in source knowledgeability did not make a difference in Pilot 
Experiment 3 (which used a fictional professor and an eight-year-old boy as putative sources), it 
remains possible that source knowledgeability carries epistemic influence when the sources are 
real, known, and personally relevant.  And although the trivia statements used in Experiments 1 
and 2 were not specific to any one academic domain (biology, history, social science, etc.), it is 
possible that some of the teachers nominated in Experiment 2 would have had epistemic profiles 
more suited to knowing trivia than others.  Future work will need to consider this possibility, and 
more generally, the question of what parameters operationally distinguish coalitional sources 
from non-coalitional sources.   
But parameters may not prove to be the most productive line of inquiry.  Coalitional 
alliance is intrinsically fluid.  A partnership today may not retain its usefulness tomorrow, or 
next week, or next year.  Although some coalitional relationships are long-standing (as with best 
friends), others are fleeting and sustained only until a particular end has been achieved (e.g., two 
rival groups united against a common foe, but then reverting to antagonism when the foe is 
displaced).  Wherever social status, power, and incentive structures (etc.) are dynamic rather than 
static, the potential for revised alliances will be present.  The likely consequence of this (from the 
perspective of natural selection) is that our cognitive architecture should be designed to flexibly 
scan and monitor the social environment for cues that signal coalitional adjustment (Kurzban et 
al., 2001).  Because the content of coalitional signals can vary substantially (verbal comments 
betraying a change of opinion, jackets revealing gang membership, yard signs announcing 
political affiliation, pendants advertising support for a particular social cause, casual association 
with a known rival insinuating an absence of opposition or the presence of collusion, etc.), it is 
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not the coalitional cue itself that matters but rather the relationship represented.  As such, 
although source valence was seen to disrupt epistemic performance in ways not dissimilar to 
coalitional status, valence alone should not be sufficient to demarcate coalitional from non-
coalitional sources.   
Finally, it is worth considering how far the Gilbert paradigm itself can take us with regard 
to the study of epistemic vigilance.  The original reports by Gilbert found marginal effects (p 
values ~.07) with moderate sample sizes (35-40 subjects).  It may be that the effects to be found 
are sufficiently subtle that only with unusually strong statistical power may we tease them from 
the data.  Conversely, it is possible that the current paradigm is simply inappropriate (not 
powerful enough, or too contrived) to properly assess the role of source information in belief 
formation.  If so, there will be diminishing returns to exhaustive exploration along these lines. 
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Appendix A: List of Trivia/Opinion Statements 
 
“The typical gestation period for a hippopotamus is about eight months, and the baby can be 
born on land or in water.” 
 
“An anemometer is an instrument that is used to measure wind speed, and was invented in 1450 
by an Italian artist.” 
 
“The Arctic Tern is a small bird that makes the longest migration of any animal, traveling from 
pole to pole every year.” 
 
“The Battle of Wavre was the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars, taking place in June of 1815 
between Prussian and French forces.” 
 
“The first postage stamp was introduced by Great Britain in 1840, and featured a portrait of 
Queen Victoria.” 
 
“The first invention to ever receive a patent was the rubber band, invented in 1845 by Stephen 
Perry to hold papers and envelopes together.” 
 
“The Hundred Years’ War between England and France actually lasted 116 years, beginning in 
1337 and ending in 1453.” 
 
“Ancient Rome was the first city to reach a population of one million people, and was 
unsurpassed until London in 1800.” 
 
“The planets make up less than one percent of the mass in our solar system, while the sun 
accounts for 99.86%.” 
 
“‘Syzygy’ is the term for three celestial bodies arranged in a straight line, as during an eclipse 
where the Sun, Moon, and Earth are aligned.” 
 
“Oxygen is the most common element in the human body, making up almost 63% of the average 
human.” 
 
“Sperm whales have the heaviest brain of any living animal, averaging more than 20 pounds, 
several times heavier than the human brain.” 
 
“The first genetically engineered organism was a tobacco plant in 1983, grown in Wisconsin and 
designed to be resistant to key herbicides.” 
 
“The Freshwater Oyster has a recorded life span of 80 years, while the longest recorded life span 
for a termite is 50 years.” 
 
“Approximately 620,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in the Civil War, more than the American 
casualties from both World Wars combined.” 
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“Biofuel production has had a tremendous effect on the price of food supplies, producing 
competition which may spark food shortages.” 
 
“Beetles have destroyed millions of forested acres in America, which may compromise the future 
of the timber industry.” 
 
“Properly paving a driveway requires a good gravel base between 2 and 8 inches thick, otherwise 
holes will appear quickly.” 
 
“Private pension plans and individual retirement accounts are less frequent in Argentina, because 
corporate schemes are often secure.” 
 
“Flu shots are safe for children, because the bacterial strains the shot contains are rendered 
neutral during manufacturing.” 
 
“An AC output is required to weld on material that has become magnetized from friction, 
because a DC output could cause an arc blow.” 
 
“Food left exposed to the air is more likely than unexposed food to contain strains of amoebas 
causing digestive disorders.” 
 
“When being introduced to someone, repeating or using their name greatly improves the 
likelihood that one will remember it later.” 
 
“Labor forces for low-paying jobs were originally outsourced to third-world countries, but now 
qualified labor is also being outsourced.” 
 
“Properly whisking egg whites requires that any trace of egg yolk be discarded, because the yolk 
fat interferes with the whisking.” 
 
“Moist heat enhances a pot roast because the cuts of meat have less fat than steak, making the 
dish more vulnerable to dry heat.” 
 
“Increased levels of tropical plant disease in the American southeast may result in the eradication 
of essential food crops.” 
 
“With the increase in world travel, experts fear that many new crop diseases could spread widely 
and affect global food production.” 
 
“The key to successfully frosting a cake is to make sure the layers are cool and free of crumbs 
before applying the frosting.” 
 
“The present economic recession in Ecuador may have important consequences for the buying 
power of its middle class.” 
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“When building a brick wall, the application of a thick bed of mortar requires the use of a 
horizontal guide to lay it properly.” 
 
“The increased affluence of China has led to an unprecedented shortage of pig and beef meat on 
the international market.” 
 
“To best way to stop sneezing is to press the tongue behind the front teeth, though firm pressure 
is necessary to achieve the effect.” 
 
“House plants are far more delicate than most people perceive, and over-watering is the most 
common cause of plant death.” 
 
“A message written in lemon juice will be invisible once it dries, but a low flame beneath the 
paper will make it re-appear.” 
 
“The requirement among American universities that printed dissertations be single-sided wastes 
40 million pages of paper every year.” 
 
“Competition from rapidly developing countries has produced a squeeze in the world market of 
raw materials that will worsen.” 
 
“Sodium chloride efficiently melts snow, and is better to use than sand which can freeze very 
quickly if reapplied frequently.” 
 
“Areas of border crossing always present more risks, because those areas provide many 
opportunities for con men to target victims.” 
 
“The common radio no longer works by processing radio waves either by amplitude modulation 
(AM) or frequency modulation (FM).” 
 
“Darwin’s contribution to biology was not the theory of evolution itself, but rather the principles 
of natural and sexual selection.” 
 
“Several species of mosquitoes continue to transmit deadly diseases such as yellow fever in the 
forests of Central America. 
 
“Sprawl has encroached upon agricultural land in many parts of the world, making food safety a 
concern in many industrialized countries.” 
 
“Some diseases among livestock have been traced to specific animal proteins that feed 
manufacturers include in their diet.” 
 
“Antidepressant medications may change the way people make rational decisions by making 
them feel positive when they shouldn’t.” 
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“Humans cannot perceive ultraviolet radiation, but many flowers emit ultraviolet “color” that 
bees can see during pollination.” 
 
“The odds of child abuse are 40 times greater for a child who lives with a step-parent than one 
who lives with both biological parents.” 
 
“In every car, there is an arrow right below the odometer indicating which side of the car 
contains the gas lid for fueling.” 
 
“A piece of jewelry with an aquamarine setting will cost more if it is a Santa Maria, which 
comes from Brazil.” 
 
“Oolong tea leaves are typically processed and rolled into long, curling leaves or into a ball like 
gunpowder tea.” 
 
“Bohemian grove is the most elite club of the United States, found in Santa Rosa, California.” 
 
“The famous masterpiece ‘Divina Proportione’ was created in a collaboration between Pacioli 
and Leaonardo da Vinci.” 
 
“A nautical mile is longer than a kilometer, but a league is longer than a nautical mile and a 
kilometer.” 
 
“Wormwood was the predominant ingredient in the original liqueur, and it was called absinthe.” 
 
“The ‘Plains of Abraham’ are located near Quebec City, the site of a historic battle between 
France and England.” 
 
“The Pali word ‘sati’ means ‘mindfulness,’ and is derived from the verb ‘sar’ which refers to 
memory or recollection.” 
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Appendix B: List of Precaution Statements 
 
“Using a cell phone or music headphones while walking alone increases your chance of being 
mugged by 73 percent.” 
 
“Freshcut produce that is not placed on ice before sale is likely to contain infectious pathogens.” 
 
“Moving between extreme temperatures can weaken the immune system and make you more 
vulnerable to germs.” 
 
“Shaving your hair will cause it to grow back darker and thicker.” 
 
“A piece of swallowed gum can take up to seven years to pass through your digestive system.” 
 
“Pure alcohol can be fattening, because the calories in alcohol are quickly stored in the body as 
fat.” 
 
“Unrefrigerated meat will grow bacteria and spoil if left out for more than two hours.” 
 
“Drinking water from a plastic bottle that was left in a heated car may contain toxins.” 
 
“The majority of murders in this country are committed against past or current romantic 
partners.” 
 
“11 percent of sexual predators capture their victims by impersonating an authority figure.” 
 
“Using your cell phone near a gas pump can cause an explosion.” 
 
“Grocery bagging that allows produce and meat to mix can lead to serious foodborne illness.” 
 
“Running an electric fan at night will increase your chance of catching a cold by nearly 50 
percent.” 
 
“82 percent of car-jackings occur in dimly lit or dark locations.” 
 
“Food that is microwaved in a plastic container may contain cancer-causing agents released by 
the plastic.” 
 
“Bread containing surface mold is not dangerous, and can be eaten without harm.” 
 
“Eating parsley before drinking can dangerously amplify the effects of alcohol consumption.” 
 
“The bite of some Missouri spiders can be more serious than Lyme's Disease from a tick.”  
 
“There are more germs on a bathroom door handle than on the bathroom floor.” 
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“Texting while driving doubles your chance of having a car accident.” 
 
“Taking medicine to bring down a fever may actually prolong the time it takes the body to 
recover.” 
 
“Antidepressant medications may change the way people make rational decisions by making 
them feel positive when they shouldn't.” 
 
“Serious recent illnesses have been traced to Angus beef that was treated with synthetic proteins 
by manufacturers.” 
 
“Genetically engineered tobacco used in smokeless cigarettes contains toxins that cling to saliva 
and can spread to others through kissing.” 
 
“Bruised fruit is more likely to be contaminated by bacterial pathogens.” 
 
“Wearing a hat during the winter helps to prevent sickness by maintaining a consistent body 
temperature.” 
 
“Using hand sanitizer does not remove as many germs as actually washing your hands.” 
 
“One can contract salmonella from homemade ice cream that is made with raw eggs.” 
 
“A common strategy for sexual predators is to hide in the backseat of an unlocked car at a gas 
station.” 
 
“Sedentary college students who stand and stretch less than once an hour are likely to have 
circulation disorders later in life.” 
 
“Soy milk and yogurt left openly exposed to air is more likely to contain strains of amoebas 
causing digestive disorders.” 
 
“Students who study in a library are twice as likely to become sick because circulated library 
books carry the germs of their readers.”  
